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Trust funds administered or created by the World Bank Group have assumed a 
variety of forms. While the World Bank as trustee has focused on its duties and liability it 
has given little, or no, attention to the legal personality of funds under its control. This has 
allowed the funders and their legal advisors space to be creative and entrepreneurial, 
particularly since neither the trustee nor the donors/funders showed any intention of 
endowing trust funds with any particular rights under international law or international 
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legal personality. As a result, funds have through their own initiatives assumed various 
forms of legal personality, ranging from mere bank accounts to fully-fledged inter-
governmental organizations. In some cases, the principal organs of funds entered into 
agreements with states and negotiated ad hoc privileges and immunities, and in one case 
a fund even managed to come under the wing of an existing inter-governmental 
organization, which in turn conferred all its own privileges and immunities to it. Practice 
suggests that funds can yield sufficient political power in international relations on the 
basis of their capital, which makes them attractive partners for other entities. This allows 
them to shape their international legal personality according to their particular needs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inter-governmental trust funds are most typically funds established with 
contributions from one or more donors to support a variety of pre-specified activities. The 
fund is established through an agreement between the fund’s administering 
authority/trustee and the donors, and it is not necessary for the fiduciaries/beneficiaries to 
be specified in name, as is usually the case.1 Donors can be State entities, as well as 
international organizations and private entities.2 The majority of international trust funds 
are related to international development and are administered by the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”), a member of the World Bank Group, the 
United Nations (“UN”) and multilateral development banks on behalf of multilateral 
donors.3 But in many cases, other international agencies, particularly those of the UN, 
participate in the administration or execution of the trust funds’ objectives, either alone or 
in partnership with the World Bank.4 The trust funds administered by the World Bank and 
other multilateral development banks number in the many thousands. The trustee may 
delegate the execution of particular objectives of the fund to other international 
organizations or private consultants, without, however, abdicating or losing the rights and 
*Professor of International Law, Hamad bin Khalifa University (Qatar Foundation), College of Law and Adjunct 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University, Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service. 
 1. Clearly, inter-governmental trusts have been modeled on their domestic counterparts and are effectively 
creatures of comparative law as applied to their inter-state context. See MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (2000); Adeline Chong, The Common Law Choice of Law Rules for Resulting and 
Constructive Trusts, 54 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 855 (2005); Adair Dyer, International Recognition and 
Adaptation of Trusts: The Influence of the Hague Convention, 32 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989 (1999); 
JONATHAN HARRIS, THE HAGUE TRUSTS CONVENTION: THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TRUSTS (2002). 
 2. See generally Ilias Bantekas, The Emergence of Intergovernmental Trusts in International Law, 81 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 224 (2011). 
 3. By way of example, the realisation of universal primary and secondary education in developing States 
began receiving significant finances through the creation of two distinct trust funds on the basis of the principles 
enunciated by the Millennium Development Goals (“MDG”) and later the Sustainable Development Goals 
(“SDGs”). The Education for All—Fast Track Initiative (“EFA-FTI”) was set up in 2002 through a global 
partnership for this specific purpose. The World Bank acts as trustee to two funds; the Education Program 
Development Fund (“EPDF”), which disburses small grants with a view to developing capacity for improved 
sector analysis and planning, and the Catalytic Fund that provides short-term grants to countries already endorsed 
under the FTI in order to implement their educational plans. See EFA—FTI Catalytic Fund: Operational 
Guidelines, WORLD BANK (Oct. 2006), 
https://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00683/WEB/PDF/CFOPERAT.PDF. 
 4. Trust Funds and Programs, WORLD BANK (last updated June 12, 2020), 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/dfi/trust-funds-and-program. 
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duties pertaining to the person of the trustee.5 The objective of the trust fund is fulfilled 
with the disbursement of monies to eligible recipients, implemented through an agreement 
and credited usually by debit to the fund’s account.6 While most trust funds are established 
by written pledges to the administering authority, in some cases they are founded on the 
basis of a multilateral treaty, as is the case with the fund created under Art. 79 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) whose purpose is to benefit the victims 
of crimes and their families.7 An additional method of fund creation is through resolutions 
of the United Nations, Security Council (“UNSC”), the most prominent being UNSC 
Resolution 687 on the Iraq Compensation Fund8 whose implementation came about later 
on the basis of donor agreements.9
Trust funds can exist informally, appearing only in the shape of an informal grouping 
of donor States, assisted by a designated Secretariat and a private bank account where 
contributions have been deposited.10 This was the initial structure of The Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (“Global Fund”) in 2002, in which the Global 
Fund’s board instructed the Secretariat and Director to negotiate agreements with the 
World Bank to serve as the fund’s trustee and with the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”) for the outsourcing of administrative duties.11 Parent trust funds may exist 
alongside an administrative trust fund, whose purpose is to manage and facilitate the 
reporting of donor contributions, fees, income and other administrative matters. Equally, 
it is not uncommon for trust funds to be composed of a non-disbursing parent fund and a 
number of disbursing subsidiary funds. The World Bank’s trustee role is largely dispensed 
through financial intermediary funds. As trustee, the World Bank provides a set of agreed 
financial services that include receiving, holding, and investing contributed funds, and 
transferring them when instructed by the Financial Intermediary Funds (“FIF”) governing 
body. Under some FIFs, the World Bank also provides customized treasury management 
or other agreed financial services; examples include bond issuance, hedging 
intermediation, and monetization of carbon credits.12 FIF trusteeship does not involve 
 5. The World Bank practically sets up a trust fund not only by opening a bank account, but formally through 
the adoption of an executive resolution that has the effect of bringing the fledgling fund within its institutional 
remit, both for internal Bank purposes as well as vis-à-vis third parties. This was the case, for example, with the 
establishment of the GEF fund through International Bank for Reconstruction & Development [IBRD] Exec. 
Directors’ Res. 91-5 (Mar. 14, 1991). 
 6. See Bantekas, supra note 2. 
 7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 79, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 136. 
 8. S.C. Res. 687 (Apr. 8, 1991). 
 9. Within the UN system, the trust agreement is hierarchically superior, over the financial rules and 
regulations of the UN’s specialised agencies, in the sense that it may provide authority to the trustee (where the 
trustee is not the United Nations or a subdivision thereof) to audit the financial management of the specialised 
agency where the latter is acting as an implementing or other entity. UNITED NATIONS, LEGAL COUNSEL OPINION 
OF 14 FEBRUARY 1995, at 414–16 (1995); U.N. DOC. ST/LEG/SER.C/33, U.N. Sales No. E.01.V.1 (2001). 
 10. Secretary-General’s Bulletin, UNITED NATIONS (Mar. 1, 1982), 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/140819?ln=en; see also Bantekas, supra note 2. 
 11. GLOB. FUND, The Global Fund Annual Report 2002/2003, at 16 (2002), 
https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/1328/corporate_2002to2003annual_report_en.pdf. 
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overseeing or supervising the use of funds.13
Intergovernmental trust funds share the following common characteristics: a) they 
are premised on agreement between the donor and the designated trustee, albeit this need 
not be a formal agreement. Thus, a Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) will 
suffice;14 b) the trust does not give rise to rights or obligations for third parties;15 c) unlike 
common law trusts where the beneficiary has equitable remedies against the trustee and 
third persons, in the case of intergovernmental trusts the beneficiaries possess no 
equivalent remedies until such time as they enter into a disbursement agreement with the 
trustee;16 d) despite the lack of equitable remedies and the contractual nature of the trust, 
it is not correct to suggest that the trustee is an agent or proxy of the donor;17 e) the trustee 
must be deemed to possess implied powers, whether under the terms of his mandate, or on 
the basis of his own institutional instruments; f) the assets of the trust fund are in the trust 
ownership of the trustee. Thus, the trustee is not the real owner of the property vis-à-vis 
the donors, but he possesses powers of ownership vis-à-vis third parties. Another 
consequence arising from this fundamental principle is that trust property is counted as 
separate from the other property of the trustee; g) trust funds need not necessarily possess 
any personality.18
Inter-governmental funds aim at assisting known or future beneficiaries in specified 
fields. Such beneficiaries are specified in the trust fund’s terms of reference—i.e., its 
constitutional charter—and can include State or other entities and are designated in general 
terms, usually by reference to some class or category. In principle, trust funds with 
technical or procedural functions on the one hand, and the promotion of substantive 
objectives on the other, can be distinguished.19 As an example of the first category, the 
UN Secretary-General set up the UN Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist States in 
the Settlement of Disputes in 1989 through the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), the 
purpose of this fund is to assist States financially in bringing disputes to the ICJ.20
The objective of environmental trust funds with a substantive agenda is to provide 
assistance to developing States in the implementation of and compliance with 
 13. See id.
14. For example, none of the surveyed Terms of Reference require the UN Environmental Program (“UNEP”)
to conclude donation agreements in the form of treaties. As a result, UNEP’s agreements with donors can take 
many legal forms, ranging from treaties to memoranda of understanding, even when donations are granted in 
respect of similar projects and sums as other trust funds concluded by means of treaties. See Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, First Conference of the Parties Decision VC 1/9, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 (Apr. 
28, 1989); MoU between the Swedish Ministry of Sustainable Development and UNEP (Feb. 2005); see also
UN-HABITAT MoU with Canada for Contributing to the Water and Sanitation Trust Fund. Other countries, such 
as Norway, preferred the conclusion of formal agreements instead. 
 15. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 231–32. 
 16. Id. at 231, 279. 
 17. Id. at 233. 
 18. See generally id.
 19. Compare United Nations, Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes 
through the International Court of Justice, U.N. Doc. A/59/372, at 5–8 (Sept. 21, 2004), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/518/22/PDF/N0451822.pdf?OpenElement, with IBRD Res. 91-5 (1991), 
Instrument of the Creation of GEF (1991). 
 20. Under the 2004 Report of the UN Secretary General, such financial assistance is available only where the 
applicant State does not challenge the ICJ’s jurisdiction or where the assistance is required in order to give effect 
to the execution of the ICJ’s judgment. See United Nations, Secretary-General’s Trust Fund, supra note 19. 
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environmental treaty obligations and especially to meet costs arising from restrictions or 
adaptation to new technologies.21 Thus, environmental treaties either establish new and 
independent trust funds or make use of existing ones, where applicable.22 In the latter case, 
implementation and compliance assistance is financed through existing trust funds, such 
as the Global Environment Facility (“GEF”), which was administered and set up jointly 
by the World Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) and UNDP.23
A third category of objectives served through trust funds is broadly concerned with 
development and poverty alleviation. The World Bank currently manages trust funds in 
the following thematic areas: a) debt service and debt reduction, such as the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative; b) environment and sustainable agriculture, such as the 
GEF; c) health and human development, such as the African Program to Eradicate 
Poliomyelitis; d) poverty reduction and social development, such as the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Trust Fund; e) capacity building and technical advisory services, such as the 
Policy and Human Resource Development Fund; f) post-conflict and reconstruction 
activities, such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund; g) financial sector 
strengthening and crisis management; and h) private sector and infrastructure 
development, such as the Water and Sanitation Program.  The World Bank’s trust program 
has been undergoing reform since 2017.24
The starting point for any examination of the sources of trust funds is the element of 
consent, far more than in any other subject matter of international law. Although there are 
instances where tacit acquiescence may be observed, the setting up of a trust fund requires 
the transfer of money by the donor to the accounts of the trustee and the trustee must have 
necessarily agreed to all the logistical and managerial burdens that circumscribe his very 
specific and onerous duty.25 The primary source of intergovernmental trust funds law, 
therefore, is agreement and this can take many forms. The agreement to donate money 
towards a common purpose, usually adopted through a donors’ conference in respect of 
large-scale operations and later transformed into a trust fund, has not consistently been 
written into a treaty, with the exception of the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”)
Statute.26 In numerous cases the agreement setting up a trust was informal and was only 
later translated into a formal arrangement through a discrete undertaking between each 
individual donor with the trustee.27 Increasingly, donor conferences are becoming 
streamlined and each pledge is written into a formal agreement, which binds participating 
States and other pledging entities. Thus, donor conference treaties, trustee-donor 
framework agreements, and trust fund administration agreements (on the basis of which 
the Bank recovers its costs to manage and administer the trust fund)28 constitute binding 
 21. See Nele Matz, Environmental Financing: Function and Coherence of Financial Mechanisms in 
International Environmental Agreements, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 473, 479. 
 22. See id. at 474–78. 
 23. See IBRD Res. 91-5, supra note 19. 
 24. WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 12. 
 25. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 237, 269; see also Reg. 3.11 and 3.12 of the U.N.’s Financial Regulations and 
Rules, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/7, at 9 (2003). 
 26. See generally BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements (2016), 
https://www.bis.org/about/statutes-en.pdf. 
 27. See, e.g., GLOB. FUND, supra note 11. 
 28. International Bank for Reconstruction & Development [IBRD], Operational Manual: OP 14.40- Trust 
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treaties between the donors themselves and between the donors and the trustee, but only 
in those cases where the parties expressly or tacitly designate these agreements as treaties. 
Where the trustee is an international financial institution, such as the World Bank 
Group, its respective agreements with the donors will be based on standard model treaties, 
all of which refer to the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement and other internal 
documents.29 These instruments that are internal to the trustee are in fact extremely 
important because the donor-trustee agreements are to be construed in accordance with 
these instruments. In the case of the World Bank, such internal instruments would be, 
among others, the Bank’s operational policies on trust funds and in the case of the United 
Nations, its Financial Regulations,30 and relevant Bulletins and Instructions of the 
Secretary-General. Moreover, the Terms and Conditions of each trust fund, as drafted by 
the trustee and confirmed by the donors, also constitutes a binding document between the 
parties, especially since this is adopted through a formal internal action by the trustee.31
In this category one may also include resolutions of intergovernmental organisations by 
which they set up trust funds,32 in which case member States to that organisation are bound 
in respect of their particular voting action, as well as on the basis of the constitutive 
instrument of the organisation. This body of soft law, save for the absolutely binding nature 
of UN Security Council resolutions, is an important normative dimension of the 
international law underlying intergovernmental trust funds. 
A significant degree of customary international law exists in respect of 
intergovernmental trust funds, but its utility should not be overestimated. In the next Part 
the reader will become acquainted with some of the fundamental principles underlying 
trust funds, as these have emanated principally through the practice of States in the course 
of their interaction with their respective trustees. The consistency of this practice, e.g., as 
regards the requirement that the trust relationship be set up by agreement, or that the assets 
of the trust are in the trust ownership of the trustee and that it does not generate obligations 
for third States or entities, have a twofold origin; on the one hand they may be derived 
from customary law themselves (i.e., that agreements do not produce effects for third 
parties),33 whereas on the other hand they clearly represent the dictates and practice of the 
Funds, paras. 7–8 (Jan. 1997) (revised in 2013). 
 29. In 2016, an updated standardized Administration Agreement template with sixteen of the World Bank’s
largest donors who provide 90% of IBRD/IDA trust fund resources was adopted, including standard provisions 
on disclosure of information and communication on fiduciary issues. This agreement was supplemented with a 
series of notes on governance arrangements in trust funds, preferencing arrangements, donor reporting, managing 
trust funds for results, and indicative budgets. See Review of 1997 Guidance Note on Governance Models—A
Proposed Framework for Enhanced Fund Management, IMF (Apr. 22, 2018), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2018/04/20/pp030918-review-of-1997-guidance-
note-on-governance. 
 30. U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Financial Regulations and Rules, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/7 (May 9, 
2003). 
 31. See IBRD Res. 91-5, supra note 19, at 2 (by which the IBRD established the GEF trust fund). 
 32. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) set up the Voluntary Fund for Technical 
Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights through Human Rights Commission Res. 1987/38 (Mar. 10, 1987); 
UN Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations, GA Res. 40/131 (Dec. 13, 1985). The mandate of the trust fund 
was subsequently expanded by G.A. Res. 56/140 (Dec. 19, 2001). 
 33. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 34–36, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The 
International Law Commission (“ILC”) Rapporteur on Effects of Treaties on Third Parties, Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, accepted that third States may be bound detrimentum tertiis—as opposed to favorem tertiis—under 
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trustee, which is thereafter accepted by the donor States. 
This article discusses the legal personality of intergovernmental trust funds with the 
overall aim of assessing whether the trust has a different identity and legal status from the 
legal person within which it is imbedded, where this is indeed the case. It will become 
obvious during the course of this article that States and contributing international 
organisations have a wide range of trust models to choose from, depending on their needs, 
the urgency of the situation they wish to address, the financial assets they are willing to 
contribute and the duration for which the trust is set up. For the purposes of addressing the 
contours of the legal personality of trust funds it is perhaps educational to distinguish 
between those funds set up around an entity endowed with legal personality, from which 
the fund derives its own personality, and trust funds which, despite their complex 
organisational structure, are devoid of any legal personality whatsoever, but depend for 
their contractual and other functions on the legal personality of their trustee. This trust 
fund model that is devoid of any distinct legal personality involves trusts organised much 
like the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (“CSCE/OSCE”), i.e., as informal groupings or associations, or as 
conferences, as well as trust accounts held by the trustee that lack an independent 
organisational structure altogether.34 Trust funds with international legal personality may 
generally be subdivided into two categories; those that possess full international legal 
personality and may validly be classified as international organisations35 and those that 
have acquired through the terms of their founding treaty only limited international 
personality. Such limited international legal personality is circumscribed by the terms of 
the respective treaties and may take any of the following forms, among others: domestic 
legal personality of the fund in the territories of the member States; full or partial 
international legal personality in the territory of the host State only on the basis of their 
respective Headquarters Agreement.36
The legal basis for the establishment of an intergovernmental trust fund will 
necessarily determine to a very large degree the contractual (treaty or otherwise) 
competencies of the trust, as well as the range of its immunities, privileges, and liabilities. 
The same instruments will certainly determine the conferment upon the trust fund of any 
implied powers and the means by which it may exercise these. Although the drafters of 
the founding instruments of trust funds do not distinguish the trust as an entity of its own 
right from that of its overarching legal person, nor from its trustee (where the trust is 
structured merely as an account for example), or from the conference of States that 
contribute to it, this is only true in respect of the procedural aspects of the trust.37 From 
the point of view of substantive law, however, the law is unclear as to the distinct liability 
particular instances, but the underlying factor in all cases is that the third State has played some part in the 
formation of a rule in a particular treaty (e.g., it has signed it, has accepted the binding nature of a relevant 
custom, or the rule concerned relates to an accepted boundary, etc.). Gerald Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur on 
the Law of Treaties, Fifth Rep. on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/130. 
 34. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 259–60. 
 35. The terms “international” and “intergovernmental” organisation are used interchangeably in this article 
with the same legal meaning. 
 36. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 259–60. 
 37. Id.
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of the trust or the legal regime governing its dissolution. One of the recurring problems 
associated with the operation of trusts in the international legal sphere has to do with the 
regulation pertaining to the liabilities and immunities of the donors, the trustee, and the 
trust entity itself.38 This issue has not generally been identified and this author is not aware 
of significant disputes between the pertinent actors, but this should not lead us to believe 
that the situation is satisfactory. In fact, in a number of areas the understanding of the 
relevant trust actors stemming from their power of self-regulation is in conflict with 
general principles of international law and notions of justice. 
II. TRUST FUNDS AS OBJECTIVE INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
There is considerable argument in the scholarly literature concerned with the legal 
nature of international organisations regarding the sine qua non elements of such entities. 
A traditionally rigid approach has in some quarters given ground to new, less restrictive 
constructions, such as the emergence of non-State entities endowed with legal 
personality.39 It is generally agreed, however, that the single most necessary ingredient for 
the establishment of an international organisation is the existence of an intention to form 
one by at least three States.40 One must thereafter look for proof of such intent; given that 
States conduct their international affairs by means of agreements, where these are in 
writing, they most commonly take the form of treaties. States, nonetheless, are not 
obligated to regulate their inter-relationships exclusively by reference to treaties.41 They 
may, indeed, do so by informal written arrangements that do not carry the burden of 
imposing binding obligations inter partes, such as MoU, or by means of commercial 
agreements that are subject to the private law of one or more jurisdictions.42 Moreover, 
they may equally govern their relations tacitly, yet in a binding manner, through unilateral 
acts that give rise to bilateral or multilateral obligations. States may alternatively choose 
to set up legal relationships by reference to mutually acceptable practices, thus leading to 
the formation of custom.43 As a corollary, the discernment of the intention to create an 
international organisation should not exclusively be sought in treaty law,44 although this 
represents by far standard practice. 
Furthermore, although traditional intergovernmental organisations (“IOs”)
encompass a three-tier basic governance structure that consists of an executive organ with 
limited voting membership, an assembly composed of all the constituent members of the 
IO, as well as a Secretariat that facilitates the day-to-day functioning of the IO, this model 
need not necessarily constitute the sole norm. Certainly, given that IOs possess 
 38. Id. at 229–30. 
 39. See generally David W. Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (1987). 
 40. Karen Mingst, International Organization, BRITANNICA (May 21, 2020), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-organization. 
 41. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 234–35. 
 42. Id. at 235. 
 43. Malcolm Shaw, International Law: Custom, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-law/International-law-and-municipal-law (last visited Jan. 29, 
2021). 
 44. See JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 10–11 (2002) (pointing 
out that the creation of the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (“UNIDO”) and the UN 
Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”) as IOs came about not on the basis of treaty, but by General Assembly resolutions). 
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international legal personality, such personality can only be conferred by those entities that 
possess it in the first place. These entities, therefore, can only be States. NGOs, individuals, 
and multinational corporations cannot, as a result, confer international legal personality 
and other IOs can only do so if their constitutional instrument gives them the power to act 
in such a manner. This limitation is aptly described by the Latin maxim delegatus non 
potest delegare.45 Consequently, where the true intent of States is identified as being 
positive to the creation of an IO, the latter’s governance structure is inconsequential to the 
nature of that entity as an IO, subject perhaps to a single exception; i.e., that of the 
appointment to the executive organ of the IO solely of persons acting in their private 
capacity. In such a—theoretically impossible—eventuality, the executive board members 
would not be acting as a college of like-minded States with the intent to pursue a common 
purpose through a single and discrete legal vehicle, which is exactly what the IO 
represents. 
Finally, the customary, but most importantly the treaty, practice of IO creation 
suggests that given the international legal personality of such entities, their personnel enjoy 
the privileges and immunities of the organisation itself. Said privileges and immunities are 
conferred by means of the constitutional instrument of the IO, which, however, serves to 
bind only the IO’s contracting parties. The extension of such immunities to non-
contracting parties may be achieved either by formal agreement between the IO and third 
States generally, or by a specific formal agreement concluded between the IO and those 
third States in which it conducts some of its operations and in which it has a physical 
presence.46 This result may be achieved through so-called Headquarters Agreements.47
These types of agreements play a significant role in respect of the operations of 
intergovernmental trust funds. 
The following three sub-sections will concentrate on three types of trust funds whose 
organisational structure and legal personality either entitles them to be defined as IOs, or 
which possess some of their characteristics without in fact having been endowed with IO 
status. Hence, we will examine so called quasi-intergovernmental trust funds, trust funds 
established by treaty as IOs, and trust funds that have been established as subsidiary organs 
of other IOs, some of which possess IO status themselves, whereas the vast majority do 
not. The next sub-section will focus on the three aforementioned elements that pertain to 
the traditional nature of IOs in order to ascertain whether, and to what degree, the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (Global Fund) satisfies the criteria for IO status. 
A. The Intention to Transform a Fund into an International Organisation? The Case of 
the Global Fund for Aids TB and Malaria 
The organisational history of the Global Fund suggests that its creators and first 
executive personnel were preoccupied with setting up an efficient entity. They possessed 
 45. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 252. 
 46. Id. at 256–57. 
 47. See generally C. WILFRED JENKS, THE HEADQUARTERS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: A STUDY OF 
THEIR LOCATION AND STATUS (1945); see also SAM MULLER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR
HOST STATES: ASPECTS OF THEIR LEGAL RELATIONSHIP (1995); Zsolt Hetesy, The Making of the Basic 
Principles of the Headquarters Agreement, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 626 (2002). 
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no clear idea as to the translation of “efficiency” into a viable legal structure. Unlike 
traditional IOs whereby their creators set out a thematic target—where applicable—but 
direct their focus on satisfying the political realities and demands of the participating actors 
first, the drafters of the Global Fund paid relatively little emphasis on the various political 
relationships, at least as these may have concerned the emergence of a governance model 
or the Fund’s legal personality. Instead, political emphasis was centred on engaging States 
to correspond to their pledges as donors and facilitate the Fund’s objectives. This lack of 
policy emphasis on structure and personality, given that the creators of the Global Fund 
were States, denotes a major departure from the negotiating phases of traditional IOs. 
Given that States are constantly concerned about their distinct place in the power politics 
of international relations, a query arises as to why they would be willing to sacrifice 
structure in the case of the Global Fund, whereas they would not demonstrate equal 
determination in regard to other more traditional IOs. Financial considerations do not 
constitute a viable argument because the Global Fund possesses a working capital of 
several billion dollars,48 being far superior in financial size in comparison to other 
specialised agencies and IOs. There is no doubt, therefore, that the Global Fund is very 
well financially endowed and as a result possesses more than ample capacity to be a 
leading actor in its field of interest. 
The answer to the question posed above seems to lie in the following factors: a) there 
was no intention to commence operations on the basis of universal participation; b) 
existence of a congregation of like-minded States; c) none of the actors were preoccupied 
with legal formalities. As a result of these considerations one may even justly assume that 
the creators of the Global Fund never had an intention to set up an IO. This assumption 
would, however, be wrong. Traditional IOs are characterised to a large degree by the 
existence of framework normative principles and even customary law that permeates their 
thematic being, even before the organisations themselves come into physical existence and 
gain legal personality. Thus, even before the UN organisation was established its post 
WWII members could rely on the 1928 Pact of Paris,49 subsequent customary international 
law relating to the use of force, the principle of non-intervention, and others. While it is 
true that the UN Charter also introduced new principles and reformulated older ones, it did 
not emerge in a vacuum. This is true with respect to all international organisations, 
technical or otherwise, whose members will have already regulated some of its operations, 
whether by bilateral or multilateral treaties or on the basis of commercial practice. In the 
sphere of trust funds the situation is strikingly different, because these are set up to collect, 
administer, and disburse monies to yet unknown recipients, and as a result their subject-
matter will not have been delineated by any kind of formal agreement, apart perhaps from 
the occasional granting of aid.50 The urgent nature—in terms of human life or the 
 48. By late 2019, the total amount of funds committed by donors to the Global Fund was fourteen billion 
USD. US$14 Billion to Step Up the Fight Against the Epidemics, GLOB. FUND,
https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/specials/2019-10-09-global-fund-sixth-replenishment-conference/ (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2020). 
 49. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 
L.N.T.S. 57. 
 50. See generally GLOB. FUND, Bylaws of the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis & Malaria, art. 2, 6.1, 
GF/B38/DP05 (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/6007/core_globalfund_bylaws_en.pdf. 
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protection of the global environment—for which trust funds are established, in conjunction 
with the lack of a coherent international normative framework regarding the granting of 
aid,51 has necessitated a flexible approach as to legal personality among the participating 
partners and stakeholders. This flexible approach did not, in the case of the Global Fund, 
entail the a priori rejection by the funding States of an IO status for the Fund.52  On the 
contrary, the primary emphasis was to first render the Fund operational and when this was 
achieved, only then could a more detailed discussion on legal personality take place. 
During the first meeting of the Global Fund in mid-October 2001, at which time the Fund 
was already receiving pledges, a proposal was tabled as to whether, in the absence of a 
formal legal structure, the Secretariat should be formally organised as a legal entity with 
full authority to make contracts and hold property.53 The drafters were also concerned with 
the “independence of the Fund and its ability to seek contributions from both public and 
private sources.”54 It was felt that were the Global Fund to be formally organised as a 
whole under traditional legal structures, it risked losing its independence, which was 
deemed vital for the type of work it was set up to accomplish.55 The legal working group 
led by Sweden presented two options a month later; organisation of the Fund as an 
independent legal entity, or alternatively as an informal alliance using an existing 
international organisation as a surrogate so that the Fund could feed on that IO’s legal 
status and benefit from its personality. Most members preferred the informal alliance 
model, yet others insisted that total independence was critical to establishing public 
confidence.56
By 2002 the TWG had decided to organise the Global Fund as an independent Swiss 
foundation, pursuant to a public deed and registered on the Geneva Trader Register.57 This 
flexible solution, however, did not succeed in resolving the Fund’s constantly creeping 
problems, despite the fact that it was independent—as per the wishes of its founders—and 
retained its public-private partnership character.58 It was soon discovered that the Fund’s
private foundation status deprived it of a significant array of privileges and immunities 
typically granted to IOs operating in Switzerland.59 This lack of privileges and immunities 
caused the Fund manifold problems in respect of its operations outside Swiss territory. 
 51. It has already been pointed out that to a very large degree intergovernmental trust funds are premised on 
self-regulation, subject to immutable rules of international law. On the other hand, the international legal regime 
of developmental aid, although permissive in nature, is seriously fragmented. Its principal legal bases are bilateral 
aid treaties and soft law instruments, such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the UN Millennium 
Goals. The collection of aid per se and the law applicable to such operations is specific to each IO and institution. 
 52. See GLOB. FUND, Bylaws of the Global Fund, supra note 50. 
 53. GLOB. FUND, FINAL REPORT OF FIRST MEETING OF THE TRANSITIONAL WORKING GROUP TO ESTABLISH 
A GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA 4 (Oct. 30, 2001), 
https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/1362/board_1sttwg_report_en.pdf?u=637319004884930000. 
 54. Id. at 5. 
 55. Id.
 56. GLOB. FUND, SECOND MEETING OF THE TRANSITIONAL WORKING GROUP (TWG) TO ESTABLISH A 
GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA 4 (Nov. 22–24, 2001), 
https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/1363/board_2ndttwg_report_en.pdf?u=637319006045570000. 
 57. GLOB. FUND, UPDATE ON LEGAL STATUS FOR THE GLOBAL FUND 3 (June 5–6, 2003), 
https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/2928/bm05_07gpcreportannex6_annex_en.pdf?u=63731900263760000. 
 58. GLOB. FUND, REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS FOR THE GLOBAL FUND 3–4 (Jan. 29–31, 2003), 
https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/2885/bm04_12legalstatusoptions_report_en.pdf?u=63731900220150000. 
 59. GLOB. FUND, UPDATE ON LEGAL STATUS, supra note 57, at 3, 5. 
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Although this matter will be dealt with more exhaustively elsewhere, it is worth 
mentioning that as a result of its private character, the Global Fund’s employees were not 
exempt from Swiss income taxation, and moreover they required Swiss work permits. 
Equally, the Fund would have had to pay value-added tax (“VAT”) and contribute to Swiss 
social security, thus increasing staff costs and making itself susceptible to lawsuits as an 
independent entity. In addition, the risk of lawsuits loomed over the heads of its personnel 
in their individual capacity, in accordance with the dictates of Swiss private law. The cost 
to the Fund, as well as the potential inability to attract good staff who would find the 
prospect of paying income tax unattractive, compared to employment in other IOs, meant 
that the Fund was forced to reconsider its fundamental premise of flexibility.60 In order to 
retain the Global Fund on Swiss soil, the federal government of that country launched a 
well-organised bid, which encompassed the signing of an Administrative Services 
Agreement (“ASA”) with the WHO, itself an IO, under which the Fund’s Secretariat 
would be subsumed within the WHO’s international legal personality.61 At the same time 
it was envisaged that the Global Fund would remain independent for the purposes of its 
own functions. Furthermore, the Swiss government agreed to provide certain tax 
exemptions and benefits similar to the privileges afforded to other IOs.62 Subsequently, 
the Fund entered into an ASA with the WHO on 24 May 2002, which although served to 
confer international law rights and privileges to the Global Fund and its personnel, was 
itself subject to Swiss law and did not, therefore, constitute a treaty.63 Besides the 
provision of administrative assistance, the Agreement essentially extended to the Global 
Fund and its personnel the privileges and immunities of the WHO, as these were defined 
in the Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the WHO on determining the 
legal status of that organisation of 21 August 1948.64 In addition, the benefits arising from 
the application of the 1947 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of Specialised 
Institutions were also conferred upon the Global Fund, as were the various Headquarters 
Agreements with nations in which the WHO physically operates.65
The effect of this Agreement is certainly not the creation of a new and distinct IO. 
The Global Fund remained an entity organised under Swiss private law, albeit its 
operations and non-Swiss staff were granted the privileges and immunities of the WHO. 
Yet, this model did not prove successful from a practical point of view, and attempts were 
made from the outset for the Fund to disengage from the WHO, an event that finally took 
place in late 2008.66 The reasons for this unhappy symbiosis were threefold: a) lack of 
logistical coordination between the two entities; b) conflicts of interest for those WHO 
personnel that were mandated to serve the Global Fund; c) lack of immunity for the Fund 
 60. GLOB. FUND, REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS, supra note 58, at 3. 
 61. Id. at 2–3.
 62. Id.
 63. GLOB. FUND, UPDATE ON LEGAL STATUS, supra note 57, at 8. 
 64. Id. at 8–9.
 65. Id.
 66. See generally GLOB. FUND, DECISION POINT: TRANSITION FROM ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 
AGREEMENT (Nov. 12–13, 2007), 
https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/3181/bm16_boardmeeting_decisions_en.pdf?u=637319003396000000.
The decision was entitled “Transition from Administrative Services Agreement”.
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from external suits.67 As a result, a new cycle of debates arose as to whether the Fund 
should move to a new model of legal personality, with the options available being the 
transformation to full IO or quasi-IO status. Subsequently, the Board directed the 
Secretariat to pursue the most optimal option, with a preference for intergovernmental 
status.68 Thus, within a matter of slightly more than a year since the creation of the Global 
Fund, the Board had abandoned its initial premise of legal flexibility in favour of an IO, 
finding that the exigencies of international life necessitated mechanisms, which although 
structurally cumbersome and rigid to external stakeholders, were nonetheless flexible 
enough to navigate in international fora.69 This sequence of events confirms, rather than 
contradicts, the liberal theory notion that the rise and workings of IOs results not from the 
rational or realist behaviour of States, but from the collective action of private stakeholders 
from within and outside States with a view to promoting and protecting particular values 
and interests.70 This conclusion is further confirmed by the fact that despite the subsequent 
legal restructuring of the Global Fund, it did not decrease its private voting membership 
of the Board.71 On the contrary, although it was pointed out that the communities living 
with the diseases could not simply be added as a voting member of the Board without 
affecting the existing voting mechanism of the Board,72 eventually the Board approved an 
amendment to its Bylaws rendering such Communities’ delegation a voting member.73
Let us now return to the initial question posed in this section; i.e., has there been an 
intent by the States parties to the Global Fund to transform it from a privileged Swiss-law 
foundation to an IO? The participating States have not entered into an agreement that is 
governed by international law with an intent of, and with a view to, establishing an IO.74
This much is clear. Nonetheless, they did enter into a Headquarters Agreement with the 
Swiss federal government,75 whose Article 1 recognises the “international juridical 
personality and legal capacity in Switzerland of the Global Fund”. Although this 
instrument in itself would not suffice to demonstrate the existence of intent as to the 
creation of a global—or at least inter partes—IO, because of its particular geographic 
circumscription as operable only within Switzerland, when the Board was discussing the 
various options for transformation it noted that intergovernmental status could only be 
achieved through a Headquarters Agreement (“HQ Agreement”).76 Whereas the HQ 
 67. GLOB, FUND, REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS, supra note 58, at 3–4.
 68. Id. at 3. 
 69. Id. at 5, 15–19. 
 70. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM.
J. INT’L L. 205, 233 (1993); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation 
in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 253 (2000). 
 71. See generally GLOB. FUND, REPORT OF THE GOVERNANCE AND PARTNERSHIP COMMITTEE (June 28–30, 
2004), https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/3395/bm08_07gpc_report_en.pdf?u=637319002688870000. 
 72. Id. at 6. 
 73. Id.
 74. See generally GLOB. FUND, BYLAWS OF THE GLOBAL FUND, supra note 50. 
 75. See generally GLOB. FUND, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SWISS FEDERAL COUNCIL AND THE GLOBAL
FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA IN VIEW OF DETERMINING THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE 
GLOBAL FUND IN SWITZERLAND (June 28–30, 2004), 
https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/3393/bm08_07annex4aagreement_annex_en.pdf?u=6373190023602300
00. 
 76. GLOB. FUND, REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS, supra note 58, at 6. 
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Agreement has been achieved, neither its text nor its general nature confer IO status to the 
Fund.77 This is hardly surprising, however, given that HQ Agreements are only meant to 
confirm the entity’s legal personality therein or confer privileges and immunities. With the 
conclusion of the HQ Agreement the Board has ceased to discuss the Fund’s legal 
personality, deeming presumably that the matter has been resolved. Certainly, the conferral 
of IO-like privileges and immunities to the Global Fund by the Swiss government gives 
rise to the specified prerogatives on Swiss territory only, but nowhere else. In order for 
this to happen, further HQ or similar agreements with third States are required. 
Proof of original intent cannot be sought from the HQ Agreement, because this is 
only of bilateral effect. Moreover, both the Fund’s Bylaws and its Framework Document 
do not constitute treaties generating legal effects for members and as such cannot be 
assimilated to an IO constitutional treaty. In any event, Article 1 of the Global Fund’s
Bylaws expressly stipulates that the Fund is to be governed by Swiss law, while no mention 
is made to international law.78 It must be presumed, therefore, despite Board aspirations 
for intergovernmental status, that there exists no expressed intention, whether through a 
new constitutional treaty, or otherwise, for the Fund to become an IO with international 
legal personality recognised vis-à-vis all member States to the Fund, or beyond. Two 
questions remain to be addressed. The first concerns the members’ willingness to engage 
in bilateral HQ Agreements with recipient (in terms of financial aid) States and therefore 
extend its quasi-intergovernmental status to territories other than Switzerland. Secondly, 
is it possible to speak of objective international legal personality on the basis of the Fund’s
privileges and immunities and its governance structure? 
We have determined that although the Global Fund enjoys a degree of international 
legal personality, as has been bestowed upon it by the Swiss federal government, it does 
not enjoy subjective international legal personality as an IO by the States that created it. 
Such a reference or inference is clearly excluded by the Fund’s Bylaws.79 Nonetheless, it 
is not improbable that the Global Fund enjoys objective international legal personality in 
other States, by virtue either of its incorporation in Switzerland,80 or by the tacit 
recognition of such status on the basis of its functions. In both cases, personality will be 
determined by reference to a country’s domestic criteria. The recognition of said objective 
personality does not entail the simultaneous recognition of IO status, especially where the 
creators of the particular entity have excluded this possibility. Alternatively, the Global 
 77. The nature of the HQ Agreement only confers IO-like status to said entity in the country where this is 
granted. Switzerland has a strong tradition of conferring such status to particular NGOs operating therein on the 
basis of its Federal Decree of 30 September 1955 On the Conclusion and Modification of Agreements with 
International Organisations in View of Determining their Legal Status in Switzerland. Similar agreements have 
been concluded with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA), and others. See Legal Opinion of M-C Krafft, On the Modifications which should be Made to the Legal 
Status of the Global Fund in View of the Transformation of the Fund into an Intergovernmental Organisation. 
GLOB. FUND, UPDATE ON LEGAL STATUS, supra note 57, at 11–15. 
 78. See GLOBAL FUND, BYLAWS OF THE GLOBAL FUND, supra note 50. 
 79. Id.
 80. In Arab Monetary Bank (AMF) v. Hashim, 83 ILR 243, the House of Lords held that although the AMF 
did not enjoy legal personality in the UK, nonetheless the treaty establishing it had been incorporated by law into 
the legal system of the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, the Court argued that comity required that “the status 
of an international organisation incorporated by at least one foreign State should also be recognised by the courts 
of the UK”.
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Fund may enjoy legal personality in other States through the conclusion of a relevant 
agreement. In following Parts we will be discussing in more details the Fund’s privileges 
and immunities. 
III. TRUST FUNDS AS FULL INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Given the limited scope of trust funds and their emphasis on the financing of 
international projects, as well as the vast disparities between them in terms of financial 
resources, one would expect that the larger—in terms of finances—among these would 
eventually adopt IO status. Judging from the experiments of the Global Fund for AIDS 
and the GEF, this presumption has turned out to be false, although it is true that their 
creators have accumulated therein many of the characteristics of IOs. In this section we 
shall examine two trust funds81 whose creators opted for an IO legal structure that does 
not, however, reflect all of the traditional characteristics of intergovernmental 
organisations. 
The first of these is the Global Crop Diversity Trust, which unlike the Global Fund 
for AIDS was founded on the basis of a treaty between States—and the participation of 
other IOs—as well as the Agreement for the Establishment of the Global Crop Diversity 
Trust.82 The objective of the Trust is to ensure the long-term conservation and availability 
of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture with a view to achieving global food
security and sustainable agriculture.83 In order to accomplish this objective significant 
resources are required and thus the Trust established an endowment fund for this purpose 
through which it solicits contributions from member States and organisations, as well as 
from private entities on a voluntary basis.84 There is nothing in the Global Crop Trust 
Agreement to explicitly suggest that the Trust is an IO, save for a passage in the preamble 
that reads as follows: “Whereas the parties to this Agreement, acting on behalf of the 
international community, have agreed to establish the [Trust] as an international fund with 
its own international legal personality and with such powers and authorities necessary to 
enable it to operate effectively and to attain its objectives . . . . “85
The Agreement consists of a handful of provisions all of which relate to procedural 
matters, but it makes mention to the Trust’s Constitution and elevates it to an integral part 
of the Agreement itself. Whereas the amendment procedure for the text of the Agreement 
requires the consent of the participating States,86 any amendment to the Constitution must 
meet the approval of the Fund’s Executive Board,87 which is composed of both public and 
 81. This is not to say that others do not exist. Art. 1(1) of the 1987 Agreement Concerning an International 
Trust Fund for Tuvalu, 1536 U.N.T.S. 48, expressly provides for the establishment of an international 
organisation. 
 82. CROP TRUST, Agreement for the Establishment of the Global Crop Diversity Trust, at pmbl. (Oct. 4, 
2003), https://cdn.croptrust.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Establish-Agreement-english.pdf. 
 83. CROP TRUST, CONST. OF THE GLOBAL CROP DIVERSITY TRUST, art. 2 ¶ 1 (Oct. 2003), 
https://cdn.croptrust.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Constitution-english.pdf. 
 84. Id. at art. 3. 
 85. CROP TRUST, Agreement for the Establishment of the Global Crop Diversity Trust, supra note 82, at 
pmbl. ¶ 9. 
 86. Id. at art. 3 ¶¶ 1–2. 
 87. Id. at art. 3 ¶ 3. This refers to the procedure contemplated in Article 19 of the Global Crop Trust’s
Constitution. 
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private representatives, all of which, however, are required to act in a personal capacity.88
The Constitution, by virtue of its incorporation as an integral part of the Agreement is 
therefore of a treaty nature.89 However, by the very fact that the parties to the Agreement 
cannot amend its provisions, the Constitution is naturally rendered a distinct and separate 
treaty, which nonetheless derives its treaty nature and force from the Agreement. It is clear, 
therefore, that the intention of the creators of the Trust was to establish an entity over 
which they would exercise no further control, such that would be flexible enough to 
achieve its aims but which would possess the necessary clout to attract funds from public 
and private sources.90 This does not mean, however, that they intended to set up a private 
enterprise, or even a foundation endowed with some privileges and immunities in the host 
State and elsewhere where agreement could be reached, as was the case with the Global 
Fund for AIDS. That this was not so is evident not only from the aforementioned granting 
of international legal personality and other implied powers in the text of the Agreement, 
but also from Article 1(2) of the Trust’s Constitution, which adds the word “full” to this 
entity’s international legal personality, as well as from subparagraph 3(a) of Article 1, 
which states that the Trust shall have the legal capacity to enter into treaties and 
contracts.91  There is a very clear intention by the creators of the Trust in these instruments, 
therefore, to establish a fund in the form of an international organisation.92 Full 
international legal personality and treaty-making powers are only enjoyed by States and 
IOs and it is therefore natural to assume that the Global Crop Trust is part of that family. 
The problem with this relationship is the fact that although the member States to the 
Agreement conferred full legal personality to the Trust and baptised it as an IO, they 
subsequently played no further active part in its functioning in the international arena.93
While the Trust’s Executive Board does include representatives from States, these 
individuals do not originate from parties to the Agreement, but represent developing 
countries and are, moreover, appointed either by the Governing Body of the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (International Treaty), the 
Donors’ Council of the Trust, or the Director-General of the UN’s Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (the latter without a vote).94 Furthermore, as we have already stipulated, 
every member on the Executive Board acts in his or her personal capacity. The literature 
on the institutional law of IOs, when examining the composition and powers of an IO’s
executive organ, necessarily focuses on that organ’s relationship with the IO’s member 
States and its independence from them.95 It is said that the executive organ should have a 
distinct will from that of its members, otherwise the entity in question will resemble a 
 88. CROP TRUST, CONST. OF THE GLOBAL CROP DIVERSITY TRUST, supra note 83, at art. 5 ¶ 6. 
 89. CROP TRUST, Agreement for the Establishment of the Global Crop Diversity Trust, supra note 82, at art. 
1 ¶ 1. 
 90. Id. at pmbl. 
 91. CROP TRUST, CONST. OF THE GLOBAL CROP DIVERSITY TRUST, supra note 83, at art. 1 ¶ 3(a). 
 92. It should be mentioned that this is also clearly stated in the Trust’s official website. See CROP TRUST,
Governance and Policy, https://www.croptrust.org/about-us/governance-policy/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2021). 
 93. See generally id.
 94. CROP TRUST, CONST. OF THE GLOBAL DIVERSITY TRUST, supra note 83, at art. 5 ¶ 1. 
 95. JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 4 (2005); HENRY G. SCHERMERS
& NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY 26–39 (Martinus 
Nijhoff ed., 2003); KLABBERS, supra note 44, at 169–76. 
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conference of States, in addition to the fact that the entity’s independence will be 
compromised and will not persist.96 The context of this principle, however, is very 
different from the particular context of the Global Crop Trust. In the case of traditional 
IOs, some member States to the founding constitutional treaty enjoy membership to that 
organisation’s executive organ, whereas all other founding and acceding States enjoy, at 
least, membership in an organ that resembles the functions of the UN General Assembly.  
While it is a myth that the State representatives to the executive organ act collectively with 
the aim to formulate a will that is distinct from that of the governments they serve, in 
reality this is exactly the case because of the competing individual interests which the 
executive organ is mandated to accommodate. Where the IO’s executive organ does not 
incorporate State parties and their government representatives, as is the case with the 
Global Crop Trust, while it is clear from the outset that it is the intention of the member 
States to create an executive organ with a distinct will, the absence of party membership 
thereof may render the Trust’s stated international legal personality problematic. To put it 
simply, while a distinct will is necessary, there must certainly exist a bond between the 
executive organ and the member States; otherwise, the absence of the State parties suggests 
the delegation of authority to natural persons in the form of an agency relationship and on 
the basis of a treaty. 
If this is indeed the case, the Global Crop Trust cannot be validly identified as an IO 
but a sui generis agency arrangement. Particular issues arise as a result in connection with 
the Trust’s liability as an independent entity, apart from its constituent member States. If 
the Global Crop Trust is to constitute an IO, rather than an agency arrangement, a new 
theoretical construction is necessary; such construction may either substantiate the 
existence of a bond between the Trust’s member States and its Executive Board, or it may 
well be that a bond of this nature is not a sine qua non requirement for the particular 
circumstances of the international legal personality of the Trust. For one thing, despite the 
conferral of full executive powers to persons acting in a personal capacity, the States 
founding the Trust as an IO remain committed members thereof. Secondly, of the ten 
voting Executive Board members, eight are appointed by the Governing Body—i.e., the 
executive wing—of the International Treaty, according to Article 19(1) of which it is 
composed of its member States.97 Equally, although the Trust’s Donors’ Council is 
appointed by the Executive Board this body is to be composed of “public and private 
donors from both developing and developed countries, who have made a significant 
contribution to the Trust”.98 Given that the member States comprising the Trust will by 
implication of their activities make a significant contribution to the work of the Trust, at 
least one of these will be represented on the Executive Board. As a result, at least half of 
the Board’s members will be appointed by member States, or other States upon whom 
similar authority has been conferred (i.e., the Governing Body of the International Treaty). 
There is no reason why the personal capacity mandate of the Board members should negate 
the international legal personality of the Trust, which exists independently of any 
 96. CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 137–39 (2005). 
 97. See generally CROP TRUST, CONST. OF THE GLOBAL CROP DIVERSITY TRUST, supra note 83. 
 98. Id. at art. 10 ¶ 2. 
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governance structure that the founding States may find agreeable. If, however, it is 
established that the independent Board members are not answerable anywhere for their 
actions, the Trust’s international legal personality would be severely undermined. Firstly, 
it is implicit from the designation of the Trust as an IO, that its personnel enjoy the 
customary and statutory privileges and immunities of IO personnel generally in the 
territory of the member States. Such privileges and immunities may be extended vis-à-vis 
third States through the conclusion of a treaty between the Trust and said third States. 
Secondly, the Trust is mandated to “operate in accordance with the overall policy guidance 
to be provided by the Governing Body of the International Treaty”.99 Finally, although the 
Executive Board may dissolve the Trust through the adoption of a resolution if it 
determines that it has achieved its targets or that it can no longer function effectively, “this 
shall not become operative until such time as the dissolution has been agreed to by the 
parties to the Agreement”.100 In similar fashion, amendments to the Constitution adopted 
by the Board must meet the approval of the parties to the Agreement.101 The available 
evidence therefore clearly suggests that the Executive Board is answerable to the member 
States of the Trust and that the reason for embracing a private governance structure is not 
to avoid liability or to establish a private institution endowed with State-like qualities and 
privileges, but rather to avoid the intrusion of politics in this sensitive sphere of regulation. 
The Global Crop Trust represents yet another example of the application of liberal theory 
to the creation of intergovernmental organisations and the shaping of their workings and 
governance structures on the basis of necessity, pragmatism and stakeholder 
participation.102
Another example of a trust fund endowed with IO status is that of the Common Fund 
for Commodities (“CFC”), which was established pursuant to a multilateral 1980 
Agreement Establishing the CFC.103 The purpose of this entity is to promote global action 
with the aim of improving market structures in international trade in commodities of 
interest to developing countries.104 To achieve this objective, the CFC Agreement set up, 
in addition to a Reserve Account, two other Accounts.105 The first of these is devoted to 
the financing of its buffer stocks and internationally co-ordinated national stocks.106 The 
 99. Id. at art. 1 ¶ 5. 
 100. Id. at art. 20 ¶ 3. 
 101. Id. at art. 19 ¶ 3. 
 102. It is exactly the expression of this pragmatism in practice that has led commentators to argue that the 
Meetings of Parties (MOP, or otherwise known as Conferences of Parties (COP)) to Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEP), while lacking Secretariats and permanent seats, operate not as mere treaty bodies but as 
“international organisations with a distinct legal personality”. This perceived IO status is objective and is based, 
in the opinion of said commentators, on the ability of MOPs to, inter alia, establish subsidiary bodies, amend the 
treaties establishing them, adopt protocols and interact with other IOs. Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, 
Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed 
Phenomenon in International Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 623, 625–35 (2000). 
 103. Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, concluded at Geneva June 27, 1980, 1538 
U.N.T.S. 3. Besides the CFC there exist numerous agreements on particular commodities, such as sugar, coffee, 
metals, and others. See J.E.S. Fawcett, The Function of Law in Commodity Agreements, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 
157 (1970). 
 104. See Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, supra note 103. 
 105. Id. at 5. 
 106. Id. at 6. 
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Second Account, on the other hand, is designated as the financing mechanism for measures 
in the field of commodities other than stocking.107 Unlike the Global Crop Trust, the CFC 
is composed only of State parties adopting the Agreement, as well as IOs that have a 
pertinent role in the field of commodities, although the latter do not possess voting 
rights.108 The positivist approach in the elevation of the CFC to the status of an IO is 
clearly demonstrable in its highest executive organ, the Governing Council, which is 
dominated solely by States whose voting capacity reflects their financial contribution.109
Moreover, the CFC is to enjoy extensive privileges and immunities in the territories of all 
member States,110 as well as “possess full juridical personality and in particular the 
capacity to conclude international agreements with States and international organisations, 
to enter into contracts . . . . “111 There is no doubt, therefore, that the CFC was granted full 
IO status in its founding constitutional instrument and not merely a certain degree of 
international legal personality, such as to be able to carry out particular functions. While 
it is true that the CFC was adopted at least a decade prior to the contemporary international 
law trust funds, whose instruments promote the active participation of private stakeholders 
and developing States, this is not the only reason as to the State-centric approach of the 
CFC.112 Indeed, there is a significant contextual difference between the funding of market 
restructuring and the funding pertaining to environmental degradation or the rebuilding of 
an earthquake-torn country. It is obvious that all matters related to public finances and 
market structures have the potential to cause serious imbalances to national economies 
worldwide and as such the active participation of external stakeholders that lack the 
element of responsibility to their constituencies would fail any test of prudence. 
IV. TRUST FUNDS AS LIMITED INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
In 1971 an International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (“IOPCF”)113 was adopted. This instrument 
was later replaced in 1992 by a convention by the same name (“1992 IOPFC”)114 and a 
Supplementary Fund. The 1992 Compensation Fund is supplementary to the 1992 Protocol 
to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 
1969,115 which governs the liability of ship-owners in respect of oil pollution damage. 
Whereas the Civil Liability Protocol is premised on the principle of strict liability for ship-
owners, thus creating a system of compulsory liability insurance, the trust fund under the 
1992 Fund Convention was set up to compensate victims in those situations where the 
 107. Id. at 7. 
 108. Id.
 109. Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, supra note 103, at 20. 
 110. Id. at 28. 
 111. Id.
 112. See UN Legal Counsel, Opinion on the Interpretation of the Provisions of Article 57(1) of the Agreement 
Establishing the CFC, 1988 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 341, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/26, which discusses the CFC’s
entry into force on the basis of its members’ subscription shares. 
 113. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage (Dec. 18, 1971). 
 114. Id.
 115. Protocol to Amend the Above-mentioned Convention (with Annex and Final Act), concluded at London
Nov. 27, 1992, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255. 
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level of compensation under the Civil Liability Protocol proved to be inadequate.116
Article 2 of the 1992 Fund Convention states that in each contracting party the fund shall 
be recognised under its laws as a legal person capable of assuming rights and obligations 
and of being a party in legal proceedings before the courts of that contracting State.117
Despite the fact that certain official reports of the trust fund refer to its status as a 
“worldwide international organisation”,118 there is a conspicuous absence of provisions in 
the treaty, such that would grant the fund the type of international legal personality that is 
enjoyed by the Global Crop Trust or the Common Fund for Commodities. Article 2 merely 
confers domestic legal personality to the fund, such that will enable it to be an equal litigant 
in the pursuit of compensation suits against its members.119 The absence of international 
legal personality is evident in the lack of immunities for the trust fund’s assets, property 
and personnel. Under the Fund Convention, the entity simply enjoys exemptions from 
direct taxes in relation to its assets and income, as well as similar tax and customs relief 
for items it imports or exports and which pertain to its official functions. The contours of 
a fuller international legal personality are only manifest in the fund’s 1971 and 1992120
Headquarters Agreement with the United Kingdom, Articles 5, 17 and 21 of which confer 
the broadest possible range of immunities to the fund’s assets and personnel. This wide 
international legal personality of the Compensation Fund was recognised by the UK 
through the adoption of a Statutory Instrument,121 on the basis of the now repealed 1968 
International Organisations Act. The HQ Agreement is, therefore, of paramount 
importance for trust entities that do not possess international legal personality.122
 116. See A KHEE-JIN TAN, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATIONS 300–09 (2006). 
 117. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage, art. 2, ¶ 2, Nov. 27, 1992, I.O.P.C. (1992) (available at https://transportrecht.org/wp-
content/uploads/FondsUe1992_engl.pdf). 
 118. Secretariat of the I.O.P.F.C., Explanatory Note on the International Regime for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage, at 1 (Mar. 2011) (available at 
https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/IOPC_Secretariat_International-Regime-Compensation.pdf). 
 119. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage, supra note 117, at art. 2. 
 120. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [UK], Headquarters Agreement between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund 1992, Cm. 3241 (Oct. 28, 1996). 
 121. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [UK], The International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund 1992 (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1996, SI 1996/1295 (May 15, 1996). 
 122. Although the Swiss government conferred international legal personality to the Global Fund through their 
respective HQ Agreement, Article 5 of said Agreement exempted from immunity of legal process, inter alia,
“counter claims directly related to principal proceedings initiated by the Global Fund”, arbitration awards 
between itself and Switzerland, as well as “disputes arising out of contracts and disputes of a private law character 
to which the Global Fund is a party” [Art. 25(1), Global Fund-Switzerland HQ Agreement]. Moreover, in an 
independent legal opinion delivered under instructions from the Fund by expert counsel in Swiss civil law, it was 
noted that the status of the Fund as a foundation under the Swiss Civil Code entailed its liability towards third 
parties in the same manner as any other Swiss private foundation, while its registration with the Trade Register 
rendered it subject to potential bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, in accordance with the Swiss Civil Code 
“An individual member of one of the Foundation’s bodies as set forth in the Bylaws would incur a personal 
liability for torts only if it were established that such individual, acting purposely or by negligence, infringed 
personally a provision of law or violated an absolute right of a third person, and in doing so, caused damages.”
This provision refers to physical persons and is not applicable to States that are parties to the Global Fund. Given 
that the Fund is not an IO and that therefore its member States cannot hide behind a corporate veil, any unlawful 
act caused, or debt incurred, by them will trigger the responsibility of that State and possibly the civil liability of 
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The Compensation Fund is a hybrid legal person standing between the status of the 
Global Fund for AIDS and that of full international organisations. On the one hand, it 
enjoys the privileges and immunities of an international organisation in the country of 
incorporation, while on the other hand on the basis of its constitutive treaty it enjoys 
domestic legal personality in other member States, without the need to enter into an 
additional HQ or similar agreement. This latter element is absent in the legal personality 
of the Global Fund. It is clear that this model best serves the interests of member States, 
since their intention in conferring legal personality to the trust fund was to fulfil its 
compensatory functions through litigation, without however putting at risk their own 
potential individual liability, which may have arisen were the fund to be organised around 
a loose association. 
A. Is the IMF a Trust Fund? 
The answer to this question is neither simple, nor self-evident. Unlike the previous 
sections, where we endeavoured to discover in the nature of trust funds an element of a 
legal personality that would be tantamount to IO status, in the case of the IMF, this query 
is posed in reverse order. Its IO status is clearly confirmed by reference to Article IX of its 
Articles of Agreement,123 as well as by its conclusion of an agreement with the UN to 
become a specialised agency thereto.124 There is no legal impediment as to the 
appointment of a trustee from within the ranks of the trust fund itself, particularly where 
the trust fund is an IO and therefore does not need to immunize its assets or seek privileges 
from the States with which it interacts. Such practice is common in the establishment and 
functioning of the Global Crop Diversity Trust,125 as well as the Common Fund for 
Commodities. The element that differentiates a trust fund from an entity with international 
legal personality that holds financial assets for the pursuit of a particular purpose, such as 
the IMF, is the possession of said assets in trust for the benefit of future beneficiaries, 
which cannot be the donors themselves.126 Were the IMF to hold a donor’s money for that 
donor’s exclusive future use and withdrawal, it would be merely performing a banking 
function and not be engaged in a trust relationship. Equally, were the IMF to simply hold 
the Fund. It has been explained elsewhere that the funds and other assets of the Global Fund that are held by its 
trustee, the IBRD, cannot be made the subject of private legal proceedings because on the basis of the trust 
agreement with the IBRD ownership of the assets has passed to the World Bank. Moreover, it is self-evident that 
the Global Fund will be subject to civil proceedings as a legal entity, as well as separately through anyone of its 
members or personnel, in countries outside Switzerland, depending on the laws of those countries, unless the 
Fund enters into HQ or other agreements to the contrary. See D. Hempel, Memorandum on the Liability of the 
Foundation and the Personal Liability of its Bodies Members (Mar. 25, 2003, on file with author). 
 123. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. 9, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. 
 124. See generally JOSEPH GOLD, INTERPRETATION: THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Springer, 1996); 
see also Protocol Concerning the Entry into Force of the Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
International Monetary Fund, April 15, 1948, 16 U.N.T.S. 330. 
 125. The absence of an externally appointed trustee in the Global Crop Diversity Trust (GCDT) is striking. It 
should be explained that the Global Crop Trust is an international organisation within which a trust fund exists 
in order to finance the purposes of the organisation. GLOBAL CROP DIVERSITY TRUST CONST., art. 1, §2 and art. 
3, §1. The Trust’s Constitution does not designate an external trustee. Nonetheless, Article 6, §2 describes the 
various functions and powers of the Executive Board. All these powers and functions are typical to the role and 
nature of the trustee. The Executive Board is, therefore, the de facto trustee of the Global Crop Fund for all legal 
purposes. It is not unknown even in the common law for the settlor/donor to assume the role of trustee. 
 126. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. 1, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. 
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the donors’ money and not possess it under rights of trust ownership, it would again fail 
to establish a trust arrangement. This is not the case, however, since the objective of the 
IMF, as enshrined in Article I of its Agreement, is to provide international monetary 
cooperation and exchange stability. 
Moreover, in its transactions with struggling member States that request its 
assistance it does not provide them with the monies paid by them upon membership ( i.e., 
their special drawing rights), but extends to them other monetary facilities, therefore 
drawing on the funds committed by other members.127 Of course, one may argue that since 
borrowing member States can only draw up to the amount they have originally contributed 
to the Fund, that it is in fact their money that they are getting back from the IMF and as a 
result the Fund was merely saving said financial assets for the beneficiaries’ rainy day. 
This argument has an element of truth, but the imparting of membership funds to the IMF 
does not necessarily mean that the State in question definitely expects to receive it back at 
some future point. Rather, as the global financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated, it is much 
more preferable for IMF resources to be used in order to help stabilise the economies of 
other nations so as to avoid a domino effect, instead of committing them for the future use 
of contributing member States.128 What differentiates the IMF from general banking 
agreements and which therefore renders it a sui generis international trust fund, is that 
while its members (essentially its settlors) foresee the possibility of becoming beneficiaries 
under particular circumstances in the future, this is merely a potential.129 Moreover, the 
overall aim of the IMF, even when it assists a particular member State, is not to assist that 
State in isolation, but to enhance and augment international monetary stability more 
generally. 
As a result, the IMF may be characterised as a trust fund, but of a sui generis nature. 
Unlike the majority of trust funds the beneficiaries of the IMF’s financial resources are 
solely States, but this is hardly surprising given its mandate.130 Moreover, while the 
beneficiaries of ordinary intergovernmental trusts possess an entitlement as to that portion 
of the trust estate set aside for them—although this is not always enforceable in 
international law and the beneficiaries themselves are not usually named—in the case of 
the IMF the beneficiaries in fact constitute a numerus clausus (and are by implication 
named). Nonetheless, they are not automatically entitled to the benefits reserved for them 
under the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, but instead require the adoption of an executive 
decision by the Fund’s executive board. The perceptive reader will validly point out that 
the disbursement policy of all the trust funds surveyed in this article require also a 
disbursement decision by either the trust’s executive organ, or its trustee. Were said trusts, 
however, to deal with a pre-fixed number of beneficiaries, as is the case with the IMF, they 
could not deny them their entitlements accruing under the trust, unless they fundamentally 
 127. See Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. 5, 2 U.N.T.S. 39; see also IMF, General Arrangements to 
Borrow, 1289-(62/1) (Oct. 18, 1992); IMF, Sales of Special Drawing Right by the Fund, 6663-(80/160) S (Oct. 
31, 1980); IMF, Interpretation of Articles of Agreement, (71-2) (Sept. 26, 1946). 
 128. This has been achieved through stand-by-arrangements under Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. 30, 
§ b, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. 
 129. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. 1, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. 
 130. See generally ROSA MARIA LASTRA, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STABILITY
371–443 (2006); GOLD, supra note 124. 
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failed to conform to the demands of the donors.131
V. TRUST FUNDS AS SUBSIDIARY ORGANS
The establishment of subsidiary organs by the principal or other organs of 
international organisations is dependent on the dictates of their constitutive treaties, 
whether expressly provided therein, or as a result of their implied powers. In the United 
Nations Charter the general authority to establish subsidiary organs is stipulated in Article 
7(2), without, however, any other appended qualifications, or the possibility for all 
principal organs to set up subsidiaries in respect of functions and powers they wish to 
delegate.132 This specific authority is contained in other provisions and in the case of the 
General Assembly, for example, this power is expressed in Article 22 of the UN Charter, 
which permits the Assembly to set up subsidiary organs, so long as “it deems them 
necessary for the performance of its functions”.133 The Charter, nonetheless, is silent as to 
whether the principal may confer to the subsidiary powers which it does not itself possess, 
or which it is not able to perform.134 The first point of this proposition is clearly 
implausible and cannot be sustained, whereas the second is only possible under strict 
circumstances. The judgment of the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion in the Effects of Awards
case seems to suggest that where the creation of a subsidiary organ encompasses the mere 
delegation of functions by the delegating principal organ, the subsidiary cannot 
subsequently bind its creator.135 Where, on the other hand, the principal is instead 
exercising a power it possesses under the Charter through the subsidiary, the latter’s
 131. Compensation trust funds certainly come the closest to identifying beneficiaries from a closed number of 
persons or entities that are identified by class or status. Compensation funds are typically set up by treaty, 
resolutions of the Security Council (S.C. Res. 692, § 3 (May 20, 1991)) as well as by unilateral acts of States—
usually through the promulgation of a domestic law and the participation of interested States, whose intention to 
become parties to compensation trust processes is manifested through the conclusion of a subsequent agreement. 
The objects of such trust funds, i.e., the class of beneficiaries for whose benefit their assets are intended, possess 
little or no freedom to forego their rights as these are reflected in the fund’s terms of agreement. Compensation 
funds are typically set up by treaty, resolutions of the Security Council, as well as by unilateral acts of States—
usually through the promulgation of a domestic law and the participation of interested States, whose intention to 
become parties to compensation trust processes is manifested through the conclusion of a subsequent agreement.
The objects of such trust funds, i.e., the class of beneficiaries for whose benefit their assets are intended, possess 
little or no freedom to forego their rights as these are reflected in the fund’s terms of agreement. 
 132. U.N. Charter, art. 7, ¶ 2. 
 133. The same limitation is true with respect to the Security Council, in accordance with Art. 29 of the UN 
Charter. On the question as to whether the Assembly and Council should rely on Arts. 22 and 29 or instead on 
the more general provision of Art. 7(2), leading commentators suggest that this largely depends on the nature of 
the subsidiary body and its prospective functions. See Danesh Sarooshi, The Legal Framework Governing United 
Nations Subsidiary Organs, 67 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 413 (1996). 
 134. The UN Legal Counsel has confirmed that the contribution of money by a trust fund (UN Fund for 
Namibia) created by a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly (UN Council for Namibia), where the latter 
was moreover the legal administering authority for Namibia, constitute “monies received from a governmental 
source”. Nevertheless, they were not found to constitute a “government cash counterpart contribution” for the 
purpose of UNDP project financing, which is where the contribution was made. Decision 83/10 of the Governing 
Council of the United Nations Development Programme Concerning Monies that are Provided from the United 
Nations Fund for Namibia, which is Administered by the United Nations Council for Namibia, to a Trust Fund 
Administered by UNDP – Question Whether Such Monies Could be Considered “Government Cash Counterpart 
Contributions”, 1983 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 194, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/21. 
 135. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory 
Opinion, 1954 ICJ Rep. 47, at 61 (July 13) (available at https://icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/21/021-
19540713-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf). 
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actions, unless ultra vires, are presumably capable of binding its creator because the 
delegation pertains to powers and not mere functions.136 The two international cases that 
shed some light on this question concern subsidiary organs with a judicial function,  i.e., 
both the UN Administrative Tribunal (“UNAT”) and the UN International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), which possess, apart from any other body, 
inherent powers particular to all judicial institutions.137
In the specific case of intergovernmental trust funds, their establishment as 
subsidiary bodies of a UN principal organ, although not judicial bodies, should always 
give rise to an investigation as to their founding premise; i.e., whether they represent a 
mere delegation of functions or of a power under the Charter. That power may well be an 
implied one, in which case the trust fund may bind its creator. We shall have the 
opportunity to examine in the following section a trust fund established as a subsidiary 
organ by the UN General Assembly and which subsequently transformed itself into a full 
IO; this is the special case of the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(“UNICEF”).
A. Trust Funds as both UN Subsidiary Organs and International Organisations: The 
Case of UNICEF 
One typically associates UNICEF with the status of a UN agency and an IO. 
However, as the last letter in its acronym suggests, UNICEF is also a trust fund in the 
manner set out in this article.138 It was established in 1946 as a subsidiary organ of the 
General Assembly,139 with its initial assets consisting of the residual funds of the UN 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (“UNRRA”)—which had recently been 
disbanded—as well as from contributions from governments and the private sector.140
Interestingly, the legal context for the creation of UNICEF was Article 55 of the UN 
Charter, which at the time that UNICEF was established was among a handful of 
provisions relating to the protection of human rights, even if vaguely worded and not 
dressed in binding language.141 Two subsequent General Assembly resolutions shifted the 
Fund’s focus to children in developing countries and continued its existence for an 
indefinite period.142 There is no wording in the founding Assembly resolution or the two 
subsequent resolutions that help to clarify UNICEF’s IO status, apart from paragraph 2(a) 
whereby it “shall be authorised to receive funds . . .  and generally, to acquire, hold or 
transfer property and to take any other legal action necessary or useful in the performance 
of its objectives and purposes.”143 Certainly, it is independent from any government, it 
136. See generally id.
137. Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (ICTY Prosecutor v. Tadic), 35 ILM 35, ¶¶ 11, 15, 18 
(Oct. 2, 1995). 
 138. Only general and technical cooperation trust funds established by the UN General Assembly and the 
Secretariat are subject to the provisions of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Establishment and Management 
of Trust Funds. 1982 U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/188. Thus, UNICEF is subject only to the UN Charter and its own 
constitutional instruments. 
 139. G.A. Res. 57(I), at 90 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
 140. Id. at 90, ¶ 2(a). 
 141. See U.N. Charter, art. 55; G.A. Res. 57(I) (Dec. 11, 1946). 
 142. G.A. Res. 417(V) (Dec. 1, 1950); G.A. Res. 802(VIII) (Oct. 6, 1983). 
 143. See G.A. Res. 57(I) (Dec. 11, 1946). 
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possesses its own budget144 and governance structure, which includes an Executive Board 
that is composed of government representatives and as is usual with all UN funds and 
programmes it is subject to the authority of the Security Council. In 1994 the General 
Assembly somewhat transformed the organisational and policy structure of the Fund’s
Executive Board by subordinating its activities under the overall policy guidance of the 
Assembly and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) and under 
the authority of the Security Council.145 Despite its seeming independence, a number of 
claims asserted by UNICEF have been dealt and claimed as UN claims.146 Under the 
aforementioned circumstances it is hard to perceive UNICEF as a typical distinct IO 
because it lacks complete independence from its creator, which is a natural state of affairs 
in a relationship between subsidiary and principal. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
scrutinise the IO status of UNICEF, but it is important to note the following considerations: 
a) since UNICEF is recognised globally as an IO, its international legal personality as an 
IO must be of an objective nature; b) its policy dependence on the United Nations and its 
two principal organs necessarily means that the UN may be held responsible for certain 
unlawful acts performed by UNICEF in the course of discharging its mandate.147
Some concluding observations are necessary at the close of the subsection dealing 
with trust funds in the form of IOs. The astute reader will not have failed to notice the lack 
of external trustee in the governance and implementation of the assets of these funds. 
Indeed, a number of reasons may underlie this policy choice, not all of which may have 
been considered by the funds’ drafters at the time. For one thing, the lack of trustee entails 
a significant decrease in expenses as a result of not having to pay the pertinent fee, 
particularly if the IO maintains an equivalent organ or is otherwise able to outsource this 
task to another body within or outside the organisation and at a much lower cost. The lack 
of trustee entails also a decrease in transaction costs because the body that takes the 
disbursement or other executive decisions subsequently implements these without going 
through an intermediary; i.e., the trustee. Equally, IOs are endowed with sufficient 
privileges and immunities, such that extend to cover their assets, which would otherwise 
be achieved only by subsuming these under the immunities of the IBRD on the basis of its 
Articles of Agreement, if the World Bank was in fact entrusted with this trustee role. 
Thirdly, it is not obvious that the three IO trust funds examined in the immediately 
previous sections perceived at the time of their creation, or even currently, their legal role 
in the same way as other trusts examined in this article. It is most probable that the benefits 
of IO status conferred upon them negated the need for a trust relationship and for assets to 
be held in trust—and not under the direct ownership of the IO—thus precipitating a 
demand for direct ownership and disbursement. 
 144. See G.A. Res. 57(I), at 90, ¶ 4, whereby the operations of UNICEF are not to be funded from the regular 
UN budget, although the UN Secretariat’s staff and resources may be utilised so long as these can be provided 
from the established services and with no additional cost. 
 145. G.A. Res. 48/162, at 7 (Jan. 14, 1994). 
146. Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831 (1950); United Nations v. B, (1952) 19 ILR 490 
(Brussels Civil Tribunal, Belgium). 
 147. Although, rather confusingly as a result of our previous considerations, the Tribunal Correctionel de la 
Seine awarded damages to UNICEF in a case arising out of a contract entered into between UNICEF on behalf 
of UNRWA [UNICEF UNRWA case]. II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 217. 
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B. Variations of Funds as Subsidiary Organs 
The UN Secretary-General (“SG”) and the General Assembly are wholly capable, 
and have in fact exercised their authority, of establishing trust funds under their implied 
powers, but whereas the Assembly may establish trust funds as subsidiary organs, the SG 
cannot.148 The progression and evolution of a trust fund from one form to another depends 
in every case on the scope and consistent growth of its activities, the support it receives 
from member States—and its capacity to convince said States through effective 
communication thereof—and its ability to demonstrate the lack of (significant!) overlap 
with other agencies. It is also required to demonstrate a need for independence in order to 
achieve its stated objectives. This is no short order and certainly demands a good deal of 
public relations, particularly in the context of a cumbersome and complex organisation 
such as the UN. This transformation was duly achieved in the case of the UN Fund for 
Population Activities (“UNFPA”), which was given birth in the form of a SG agency by 
the use of his implied powers.149 With the gradual growth of its activities and relative 
successes, the General Assembly decided to bring the Fund under its legal wing and 
transform it into its subsidiary organ.150 The Assembly succinctly noted that the UNFPA’s
“scope of operations have now grown to a size which makes its supervision by an 
intergovernmental body desirable”151 and “invited the [Fund’s] Governing Council to 
organise itself in such a way that it can exercise effectively its [ascribed by the Assembly] 
functions, taking into account the separate identity of UNFPA and its need to operate under 
the guidance of ECOSOC . . .  [through the Governing Council of UNDP]”.152 With the 
change in status comes also a change in legal personality and powers. Although no general 
rule may be said to exist on the matter,153 subsidiary organs may subsequently create other 
subsidiary organs, so long as this is not excluded from their mandate.154 Thus, the direct 
descendants of principal organs may well decide, as is generally the case, that additional 
trust funds be established to cover mainly technical expenses or undertake similar technical 
functions, so as to separate these from the main budget of the original Fund. While these 
entities are not generally subsidiary bodies, they may be endowed with a distinct 
governance structure, even if a primitive one. 
More significantly, the move to subsidiary organ status may entail a relative 
independence from the principal organ in terms of legal personality and budgetary control. 
Resolution 3019 by which the Assembly transformed the UNFPA, asked the new entity’s
Governing Council to concern itself with its annual budget, as well as set up appropriate 
 148. U.N. Charter, art. 22. 
 149. See generally About us, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND (last updated Jan. 2018), unfpa.org/about-
us. 
 150. G.A. Res. 3019(XXVII) (Dec. 18, 1972). 
 151. Id. pmbl. ¶ 5. 
 152. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 3. 
 153. G.A. Res. 3351(XXIX) (Dec. 18, 1974) (deciding that General Assembly subsidiary bodies should not 
under ordinary circumstances set up other bodies that require additional resources without the Assembly’s
approval). 
 154. 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 224 (B. Simma ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
2002). This is subject of course to the delegatus non potest delegare maxim. What this means is that subsidiary 
organs would not be able to delegate their powers to a further subsidiary entity, but only their functions. 
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administrative and financial regulations and policies.155 At this juncture, it is wise to 
distinguish two types of subsidiary organs in respect of their budgetary dependence. On 
the one hand, there are those that are mandated to carry out a particular task without said 
task containing a fund raising or disbursement objective. This is particularly true of SC-
appointed sanctions committees156 as well as organs such as the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee.157 On the other hand, principal organs establish subsidiary entities with the 
sole purpose of raising money in order to finance a particular type of operation. Trust funds 
fall squarely within the second category.158 Whereas it would prove catastrophic to sever 
part, or all, of the budgetary links between the first type of subsidiary organs from their 
principal counterparts, the particular mandate of the second type creates no such problems. 
More importantly, it resolves the concerns raised by Assembly Resolution 3351 on the 
limitation of new subsidiary entities because trust funds would by their nature not require 
additional resources.159 Nothing in the resolution establishing the UNFPA suggests that 
its budgetary decisions require the prior approval of the Assembly and coupled with its 
broad implied powers (“ . . . organise itself in such a way that it can exercise effectively 
[its] functions . . . “) and “separate identity”, it must be presumed that the Assembly 
intended no budgetary dependence between itself and UNFPA.160 This lack of dependence 
works both ways and hence the Fund may utilise its assets for purposes falling broadly 
within its mandate, even if its creator is not in full agreement. This wording, as well as that 
contained in Assembly Resolution 57(I) establishing UNICEF, is wider in terms of legal 
personality than that normally afforded to subsidiary organs or agencies of the United 
Nations.161 All UN entities are endowed in their external relations with the personality of 
the organisation itself, the applicability of Articles 104 and 105 of the UN Charter, as well 
as the benefits of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN. Thereafter, 
the extent to which a subsidiary organ may contract and enter into treaty relations with 
other States or IOs is a matter for the principal organ to regulate through the founding or 
subsequent resolutions. The authority to “take any other legal action necessary” for the 
performance of its objectives necessarily grants the subsidiary organ an enhanced legal 
 155. G.A. Res. 3019(XXVII) (Dec. 18, 1972). 
 156. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999), as lastly modified by S.C. Res. 1735 (Dec. 22, 2006); S.C. Res. 
1533 (Mar. 12, 2004). 
 157. S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 158. The UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Establishment and Management of Trust Funds states that 
the Organisation recognises two types of trust funds: general and technical cooperation trust funds. U.N. Doc. 
ST/SGB/188, at ¶ 4 (Mar. 1982). Specialised agencies within the UN system are free, however, to recognise 
further sub-specialisations of trust funds in accordance with their mandates and institutional law. Thus, UNEP, 
in addition to general and technical cooperation funds, distinguishes between the following categories of trust 
funds: a) those that provide direct support for implementation of the UNEP program of work; b) those that 
provide support for UNEP-administered conventions, protocols and regional seas programs, and; c) those 
belonging to a special category of trust funds supporting activities supported by UNEP. This latter category 
includes, among others, the Trust Fund serving the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layers and all trust funds funded by the GEF for which UNEP is an implementing agency. See REPORT OF UNEP
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ON ENVIRONMENT FUND BUDGETS: PROPOSED BIENNIAL PROGRAMME AND SUPPORT 
BUDGET FOR 2008–09, UNEP Doc GC/24/9/Add.2, at 7 (Dec. 1, 2006). 
 159. G.A. Res. 3351(XXIX) (Dec. 18, 1974). 
 160. G.A. Res. 3019(XXVII), at pmbl. ¶ 3 (Dec. 18, 1972). 
 161. G.A. Res. 57(I) (Dec. 11, 1946). 
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personality and autonomy in its decision making capacity from that of its creator.162
Other entities, despite their significant role and mandate have not been transformed 
by the Council and the Assembly into subsidiary organs. The reasons for this policy choice 
lie in our aforementioned analysis in this section. For example, the SG’s Trust Fund to 
Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes through the International Court of Justice163 is 
rather small for the Assembly to concern itself for any upgrade. This lack of upgrade is 
also a natural consequence of the limited scale of operations of trust funds that already 
exist as subsidiary organs. In their case a possible upgrade would enhance their position 
in the UN system and provide them with broader powers. The UN Trust Fund for Chile 
was set up by the General Assembly at the height of the country’s dictatorial nightmares 
and in order to assist victims and their families.164 Despite the subsequent consolidation 
of its activities to cover the theme of torture generally and with a global focus in 1981,165
the new Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture did not receive any additional powers. The 
same is equally true for the United Nations Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery.166 As a result, the financial or other successes of such trust funds largely depends 
on the ingenuity and clout of their executive board members in pushing their agendas 
within the UN system and thus making their voices heard, as well as using their clout to 
solicit financial contributions. 
C. Trust Funds as Informal Conferences without Any Legal Personality 
The governance models employed by various trust funds demonstrate the 
complexity in structure that some of them eventually assume. Yet, none of these complex 
structures are organised around a legal person, whether domestic or international in nature. 
Instead their creators seem content to give them a loose legal character, deeming it 
sufficient that their assets are held in trust by the trustee and under the latter’s privileges 
and immunities. In fact, their legal existence does not appear to be any more superior to 
that of trust accounts, since the World Bank’s practice in respect of such funds is to 
incorporate them as trust accounts. The trend seems to have begun with the GET/GEF,167
but as a matter of consistent and justifiable practice it has blossomed in respect of trust 
funds established in the aftermath of a large natural disaster or other emergency situations 
in which significant funds were urgently required to address said urgency. The 
accumulation of significant funds to cope with urgent situations such as the Indonesian 
 162. Id.
 163. U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 7–11, U.N. Doc. A/44/PV.43 (Nov. 1, 1989); see REPORT OF THE I.C.J. ON 
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S TRUST FUND, U.N. Doc. A/47/444 (Oct. 7, 1992), Annex, Terms of Reference of 
the I.C.J. Trust Fund. 
 164. G.A. Res. 33/174 (Dec. 20, 1978). 
 165. G.A. Res. 36/151 (Dec. 16, 1981). 
 166. G.A. Res. 46/122 (Dec. 17, 1991). 
 167. A typical example of an intergovernmental trust fund whose relationship with its donors is contractual in 
nature, such that it encompasses the virtues of a treaty, is the Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The Restructured GEF Instrument is reproduced in (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1273, 
as subsequently amended in 2008 and later in 2011. See Jacob Werksman, Consolidating Governance of the 
Global Commons: Insights from the GEF, 6 Y.B. INT’L ENV’T L. 27 (1995); Peter Sand, Trusts for the Earth: 
New International Financial Mechanisms for Sustainable Development, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (W. Lang ed., Springer 1995). 
28
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss2/5
2021] LEGAL PERSONALITY OF WORLD BANK FUNDS 237 
tsunami, the reconstruction of post-2003 Iraq, or the reconstruction of South Sudan and its 
process of self-determination, require instantly available and executable pledges without 
the formalities of setting up an organisation or entering into a multilateral treaty.  
Nonetheless, no State or private donor would be willing to slice a considerable part of their 
national budget for the sake of a humanitarian operation without a responsible and 
accountable governance structure that will oversee and decide on matters relating to 
spending and disbursement and provide detailed reports to the donors. The outcome of 
these tailor-made demands have culminated in the development of emergency trust funds, 
which although do not involve the existence of a legal person or the adoption of 
multilateral treaties (but instead are premised around distinct donor agreements with the 
trustee) they are governed by a complex structure that resembles that of large international 
organisations. 
Typical examples of such emergency funds that lack a formalised legal personality 
are the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (“IRFFI”),168 the Multi Donor 
Trust Fund for Sudan (“MDTF-SS”)169 and the Multi Donor Trust Funds for Aceh and 
North Sumatra. Equally, while the GEF was predicated around a multilateral agreement, 
it does not possess legal personality, despite its very extensive governance structure, which 
is often times confusing even for the organs and entities encompassing it.170 All these 
loose conference-type associations of contributors substitute their lack of legal personality 
that would otherwise preclude them from entering into legally binding relationships with 
third entities, by a) relying on the legal personality of their trustee or implementing agents, 
or; b) as in the case of the GEF, by relying on the multilateral institutions that are funded 
by the GEF’s accumulated assets. In this sense, the legal person of the trustee enters into 
agreements with the donors,171 the beneficiaries172 and the various agents that implement 
parts of the projects or serve as procurers. Although the assets of the trust fund are naturally 
subsumed within the legal person of the trustee and, as a result, enjoy his privileges and 
immunities, the contributors, both States and private entities, are liable with respect to 
debts or unlawful acts caused as a result of their management of the trust fund, to the extent 
that the debt or unlawful act can be attributed to them, whether by intention or through 
negligence. As regards private donors, their liability would be subject to the laws of the 
State where the unlawful act materialised, whereas with respect to States, their liability 
 168. The International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) was launched by the international 
community in 2004 and is composed of two distinct-purpose funds; the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund and the UN 
Development Group (UNDG TFI) Iraq Trust Fund. Both trust funds are administratively subsumed within IRFFI, 
which itself as a singular entity is governed by a Donor Committee, a Facility Coordination Committee, in 
addition to the two trustees of the respective funds. International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq Terms of 
Reference, para. 8 (Oct. 29, 2007). 
 169. Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds, Operations Manual (Nov. 2006, draft version 3). 
 170. See Global Envtl. Fund [GEF], GEF Doc., GEF/C.21/Inf.5 (Apr. 16, 2003) (clarifying the Roles and 
Responsibilities of the GEF Entities). 
 171. U.K. Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev./Int’l Dev. Ass’n [UK-IBDR/IDA] Agreement for the Asia-
Europe Meeting Trust Fund 2 (T.F. 027914) (Mar. 14, 2001); China Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev./Int’l
Dev. Ass’n [China-IBRD/IDA] Agreement for the Asia-Europe Meeting Trust Fund 2 (T.F. 027914) (Aug. 23, 
2002). 
 172. Int’l Dev. Ass’n-Gov’t of S. Sudan [IDA-GoSS], Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development 
Project, Grant No. T.F. 091282 (Dec. 18, 2007); Int’l Dev. Ass’n-Gov’t of S. Sudan [IDA-GoSS], Southern 
Sudan Rapid Impact Emergency Project, Grant No. T.F. 055976 (Nov. 24, 2005). 
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would be assessed by reference to the law of State responsibility.173 Certainly, the 
contributing nations could have opted to formalise their informal conference association 
subsequent to the setting up of their respective trusts, in order to avoid personal, as opposed 
to corporate, liability and perhaps with a view to enhancing their power status within the 
trust fund. In practice, however, this solution has never even been considered and one can 
only speculate as to the possible reasons. For one thing, convening a diplomatic conference 
and later setting up a formal organisation is not cost efficient, when all this may just as 
well be avoided. Secondly, these trusts are only set up to address urgent situations that are 
no doubt temporary in duration, for which the establishment of a formal organisation 
would be too time consuming, let alone, cost consuming in relation to its purpose. Finally, 
it is evident that the contributing States exercise, or can exercise if they so choose, a high 
degree of decision-making powers. Moreover, they confer upon the trustee many of those 
functions that would be too burdensome for themselves to carry out, or which are 
duplicative and expensive to set up ad hoc, but for which the trustee possesses the requisite 
amount of expertise.174 In all other respects, given their nature as trust accounts, the 
analysis in the following section is applicable to multi donor trust funds that lack any legal 
personality. Unlike trust accounts, funds operating under informal conferences necessarily 
entail the active participation of contributors at all stages of the fund’s operations. Trust 
accounts, on the other hand, generally presuppose that the contributors have little interest 
in being actively engaged in the workings of the fund, subject to exceptions obviously. 
VI. THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS
We have so far seen that as a general rule States do not wish to proliferate institutions 
with distinct international legal personality, unless this is absolutely necessary for the 
purposes they have set out. Nonetheless, whereas not all trust funds enjoy the same 
personality as that of a fully-fledged IO, many are in fact able to exercise a range of 
functions that encompass a certain, even if limited, degree of international legal 
personality.175 We have already alluded to the likelihood of setting up trust funds as mere 
bank accounts, administered wholly by their trustees. In terms of personality, one should 
distinguish on the one hand the account and the funds contained within it from the trust 
fund itself, for which the account exists. In theory the two are different, but in practice 
they are not, because there is no intention of granting the trust fund entity any legal 
personality whatsoever. The World Bank, for example, does not differentiate between the 
two and commingles trust fund assets maintained by it, even where the trust fund in 
question is managed by a distinct management committee, which is composed of donor 
 173. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 234. 
 174. Informal associations of States that yield significant powers are not a new phenomenon. The CSCE/OSCE 
does not possess international legal personality, yet it has undertaken most of the EC and NATO’s post-conflict 
operations in Europe and the Caucasus. See Miriam Sapiro, Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects 
of a Political Transformation, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 631 (1995). In fact, the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe, Budapest Summit Declaration and the Decision on the Strengthening the CSCE, ¶ 29, 34 
I.L.M. 767, 775–76 (Dec. 6, 1994), made it clear that the change in name did not alter the legal status of this 
entity. 
 175. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 260. 
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States.176 In all such cases, all transactions with third parties, whether of a private or public 
(international) character are conducted through the legal personality of the trustee and not 
that of the fund177—which in fact may possess a very elaborate structure within the 
organisation of the trustee. The same is true in respect of trust fund accounts administered 
by the United Nations. Given that these are established as bank accounts, in accordance 
with Rule 104.4(a) of the UN’s Financial Regulations and Rules, all “[b]ank accounts shall 
be designated ‘official accounts of the United Nations’ and the relevant authority shall be 
notified that those accounts are exempt from taxation.”178
Our aforementioned analysis only paints half of the picture. Indeed, where it is clear 
from the intention of the donors or the trustee, where the latter alone sets up a trust fund, 
that the fund is to operate solely through an account, then the trust fund possesses no legal 
personality. Nonetheless, even in such cases, the account persists as an entity despite its 
lack of personality. Its status may be sought in three particular fields: a) in the institutional 
law of the trustee, in whose name it is subsumed, given that it will be subject to its 
operational policies and procedures; b) the treaty relations between the donors that 
established it, where a treaty was in fact involved, and; c) in the overall trust relationship 
between donors, trustee and beneficiaries, for whom the trust fund account represents a 
legal entity, despite the fact that as regards third parties the account is not distinguishable 
from the legal person of the trustee, whether the World Bank, UN, or other.179 This 
conferral of a very limited legal personality for merely practical purposes was usually 
implicit in the past, but is increasingly written into contemporary trust instruments.180
Where a principal organ of the UN sets up a trust fund in the form of a subsidiary 
organ under the leadership of a distinct body, such as the Trust Fund for Victims of 
Torture,181 the account and the trust are distinct in terms of personality from their 
administrator. This is not clear in the body of resolution 36/151, albeit paragraph 1(c) of 
said resolution designates the UN Secretary-General as administrator of the Fund, which 
itself is subject to the UN’s Financial Regulations.182 There are numerous provisions in 
the UN’s Financial Regulations that stipulate, mostly indirectly, that emphasize this 
 176. UK-IBRD Administration Agreement concerning the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Agreement for the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (T.F. 053509, Aug. 19, 2004) (available at: 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/eitimdtf). 
 177. Instrument to Establish the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative-I Trust, §, ¶ 3(a), Nov. 23, 2005, IBRD 
Decision 13588-(05/99) MDRI, sec. 1, par. (3)(a) of which states that “[t]he operations and transactions of the 
Trust shall be conducted through an account.” In accordance with sec. IV, par. (1)(c)(i), the establishment of 
accounts is to be made in the name of the IMF, which thereafter shall assume the form of accounts of the IMF. 
Id. at §4(1)(c)(i). 
 178. U.N. Secretary-General, Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. 
ST/SGB/2003/7 (May 9, 2003). 
 179. G.A. Res. 36/151, United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture (Dec. 16, 1981). 
 180. Paragraph eleven of the 2008 Decision of the COP to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol confers upon the 
Adaptation Fund Board “such legal capacity as [is] necessary for the discharge of its functions with regard to 
direct access by eligible Parties and implementing and executing entities . . . in particular legal capacity to enter 
into contractual agreements and to receive project, activity and programme proposals directly and to process 
them . . . as appropriate . . . .” Conference of the Parties, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its fourth session, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.2 (Mar. 19, 2009). 
 181. G.A. Res. 36/151, United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture (Dec. 16, 1981). 
 182. See id.
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distinction. For example, Regulation 4.18 stipulates that the income derived from 
investment of fund assets shall be credited to the fund in question, whereas Regulation 
4.19 states that investments derived from the Working Capital of the UN shall be credited 
as miscellaneous income.183 Whereas the UN undertakes all transactions pertaining to the 
account under its own name, the trust fund as an entity enjoys separate personality as 
stipulated in its mandate.184 For obvious practical purposes, the members of the governing 
bodies of such trusts will not engage in private or public transactions, but instead undertake 
political functions on behalf of the trust they represent. In all other cases, the intention to 
implement such a distinction should be clearly read in the respective instrument. The 2005 
Agreement for the Administration of the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) II is silent 
on any legal personality of the Fund and Article III(2) obliges the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) to set up accounts and administer them.185 Article VII of the 
Agreement, however, provides that “in the contracts it signs in administering the resources 
of the Fund and carrying out its operations, and in all other Fund-related documents, the 
Bank shall indicate clearly that it is acting as the Administrator of the Fund”.186 In this 
provision there must be read an intention to endow the MIF with some degree of 
international legal personality on account of two reasons: a) because the MIF was 
established on the basis of a multilateral treaty, the 2005 Agreement establishing the MIF 
II, Article II of which requires member States to submit instruments of acceptance and 
contribution; b) moreover, the Fund is governed by a Donors’ Committee, which is 
responsible for “the final approval of all proposals for operations of the Fund”.187 It is thus 
evident that trust accounts are not always devoid of legal personality, but one should 
examine their mandate and legal basis and seek to ascertain the establishment of a 
governing body that is distinct from the trustee. Moreover, one must also examine 
particular provisions in the enabling instrument that pertain to the distinctiveness of the 
trust from the personality of the trustee. 
A. The Contractual Powers of Trust Funds 
This section aims to assess the competence of trust funds to conclude agreements in 
their own name with third parties and assume responsibility thereof, whether in the form 
of a treaty, a contract governed by the law of a particular country, or by means of non-
binding accords. It is taken for granted that trust fund accounts lacking any legal 
personality whatsoever are incapable of entering into agreements solely in their own name. 
In such cases the trustee will contract on behalf of the trust account and the trust account 
will appear on the contract, but only so that it is known to the contracting parties that 
 183. U. N. Secretary-General, Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. 
ST/SGB/2003/7 (May 9, 2003). 
 184. Indirectly confirmed by reference to Reg 4.18 of the UN Financial Rules and Regulations. 
 185. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Investment Fund II, art. III(2), Apr. 9, 2005, Inter-American 
Devel. Bank. 
 186. Id. at art. IV(1). 
 187. Id. at art. IV(2). This result is confirmed by the Letters of Agreement entered into between the IDB and 
the MIF’s beneficiaries, in which the IDB clearly stipulates that it is only acting as administrator of the Fund. 
See IDB, Jamaica Agri-Stakeholders Association Ltd Letter of Agreement, IDB Doc. LEGIII/JA-673923-06 
(July 3, 2006); IDB, Jamaica Hotel and Tourist Association Letter of Agreement, IDB Doc. LEGIII/JA-850321-
06 (Feb. 13, 2007). 
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potential liability burdens the assets of the trust account only and not the assets of the 
trustee or of other entities.188
On the other side of the spectrum, trust funds organised as intergovernmental 
organisations will be deemed competent to enter into all of the aforementioned 
agreements, unless their constitutive instruments prohibit them from so doing.189 If said 
instrument is silent, it will be in the remit of the trust fund’s implied powers to conclude 
treaties and other agreements in the pursuit of its objectives. 
The competence, whether explicit or implicit, to enter into agreements is a very 
strong determinant of an entity’s legal personality. We have already observed the complex 
web of relationships belying the GEF, but this author does not agree with the contention 
that the GEF does not possess any legal personality. The 1994 Instrument for the 
Restructured Global Environmental Facility has, as has already been explained, the 
attributes of a treaty.190 Moreover, unlike its predecessor, it is not grounded in the World 
Bank and is composed of an organisational structure that resembles a typical IO, albeit it 
is clear from the intentions of the parties that it is not of this nature.191  Nonetheless, in 
their sixth meeting in 1994 the parties establishing the GEF agreed that it should possess 
“such legal capacity as is necessary for the exercise of its functions and the protection of 
its interests, in particular the capacity to enter into contracts, to acquire and dispose of 
movable and immovable property and to institute legal proceedings in defence of its 
interests.”192
Moreover, the GEF was endowed with such privileges and immunities as are 
necessary for the discharge of its functions under Decision VI/16.193 There is clear 
evidence, therefore, that this entity possesses a wide degree of international legal 
personality, but it is not obvious from the text of the Decision whether, apart from private 
contracts, it may also enter into treaties with States and IOs. The simple answer to this 
question would be negative because of the GEF’s lack of governmental or 
intergovernmental status. This, however, does not deprive it from the possibility of 
concluding agreements with said entities that are governed by international law. An 
examination of the contractual practices of the GEF, as far as this is possible, reveals that 
the GEF relies on its trustee, its implementing agents, as well as its executing agents for 
the conclusion of agreements with States and private entities;194 the former would have 
the status of treaties, whereas the latter would not. Where an international development 
bank is responsible as trustee for the conclusion of loan and guarantee agreements on 
 188. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 261. 
 189. Id. at 238. 
 190. See Werksman, supra note 167, at 58. 
 191. Id. at 56–57. 
 192. U.N. Environment Programme, Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Dec. VI/16, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/7 (Oct. 10, 1994). 
 193. Id.
 194. Int’l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev. [IBRD], Global Environment Facility Trust Fund Grant Agreement 
Implementation of the Strategic Action Plan for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Grant No. T.F. 021707 (Mar. 21, 
1999); Asian Development Bank, Financing Agreement (Land Improvement Project), Loan No. 2245/2246(SF)-
UZB (Aug. 21, 2008) (in which the ADB acts as executing agent of the GEF in respect of a grant awarded to 
Uzbekistan) (available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Legal-Agreements/UZB/37536/37536-UZB-
FA1.pdf). 
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behalf of the trust fund, it is the institutional law and practice of that bank which is 
pertinent in assessing the formalities of contract and applicable law.195 The IBRD and 
IDA themselves subject their loan and credit arrangements with State entities196 to public 
international law,197 subject to very minor and specific exceptions in respect of necessarily 
local matters such as the creation of sureties. On the other hand, the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) subjects its arrangements with States to a given national law.198 The 
contractual practice of the GEF suggests further, as is reasonable, that it is not only the 
grant agreements that are entered into by the trustee and other implementing agents, but 
also all project agreements.199 This is obviously done as a result of cost-effectiveness 
considerations. 
Where the entire gamut of the contractual transactions of a trust fund are performed 
by its trustee, the applicable law and terms of said contracts are most commonly predicated 
on the trustee’s institutional requirements and internal by-laws.200 The United Nations, for 
example, in its contractual relations with private entities (e.g. contractors) appends thereto 
as an integral part its General Conditions of Contract, with particular variations in respect 
of contracts for construction,201 the provision of goods,202 consultancies and others. This 
instrument is rather favourable for the UN. The applicable law in respect of individual 
contracts is a matter for negotiation between the parties and as a result it is not stipulated 
in the General Conditions, which do, however, oblige the parties to settle their disputes 
through an arbitral mechanism, should other amicable means fail.203 The practice of the 
IBRD is somewhat different and section 1.02 of the revised 2017 General Conditions for 
Loans stresses that “[i]f any provision of any Legal Agreement is inconsistent with a 
 195. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 238. 
 196. The IBRD typically enters into loan and guarantee agreements with borrowing States, upon which these 
States assume full responsibility for carrying out the project in respect of which the funds were borrowed. Where 
the direct borrower is a private entity the Bank will enter into a Guarantee Agreement with the government of 
the relevant member State. 
 197. IBRD, General Conditions Applicable to Loan and Guarantee Agreements, § 10.01 (Jan. 1, 1985), 
https://ppfdocuments.azureedge.net/3973.pdf (in accordance with which the Agreement expressly prevails over 
any domestic law to the contrary); IBRD, General Conditions for Loans, § 8.01 (July 1, 2005, as amended 
through Oct. 16, 2006), https://ppfdocuments.azureedge.net/3954.pdf; Int’l Dev. Ass’n [IDA], General 
Conditions Applicable to Development Credit Arrangements, § 10.01 (Jan. 1, 1985, as amended Dec. 2, 1997), 
https://ppfdocuments.azureedge.net/3978.pdf. These General Conditions, much like those of the UN, constitute 
integral components of subsequent agreements with recipient States and are implicitly binding on the parties. See
Development Credit Agreement (Management of the Petroleum Economy Project), IDA-Chad, Mar. 20, 2000, 
Credit No. 3316 CD. The same is true of section 7.01 of the Bank’s Loan Regulations (1956), which expressly 
exclude the application of all or any municipal law in contracts between the Bank and a borrower. IBRD, Loan 
Regulations, § 7.01 (June 15, 1956). 
 198. Hugo J. Hahn, Agreements for the Provision of Credit and Financial Guarantees by States under Public 
International Law, in CREDIT AND GUARANTEE FINANCING TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 6 (C.C.A. Voskuil, Z. 
Para , J.A. Wade eds., Martinus Nijhof 1987).
 199. IBRD, Project Agreement (Klaipeda Geothermal Demonstration Project), Grant No. T.F.028313 (June 
28, 1996). 
 200. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 238. 
 201. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, Special Conditions for Construction Works,
http://www.ci.undp.org/ptd/pdf/speccon.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2021). 
 202. See U.N. Procurement Division, Contracts for the Provision of Goods (Apr. 2012) (available at 
https://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/sites/www.un.org.Depts.ptd/files/files/attachment/page/pdf/general_condition_g
oods.pdf). 
 203. Id. at § 16.2. 
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provision of these General Conditions, the provisions of the Legal Agreement shall 
govern.”204 This affirms that in the IBRD’s legal relationships with third parties there are 
situations whereby its institutional law is by no means imperative, whereas with respect to 
others, the Bank’s institutional law is a sine qua non of the transaction. The latter is true, 
at least, with regard to the Bank’s consent in setting up and administering trust funds. 
The UN Legal Counsel has made it clear that the organisation can incur liabilities of 
a private nature, particularly where they arise from transactions arising from contracts, 
purchase orders, leases and other agreements.205 Equally, therefore, the choice of forum 
and lex arbitri is a matter to be settled by agreement between the parties. The governing 
law of private contracts entered into between IOs and private entities is usually designated 
by reference to the law of the seat of the IO, particularly where the private party’s
operations lie therein.206 Conversely, where the performance of the contract is to be 
undertaken in a territory other than the seat of the organisation, especially where these are 
of a small scale not involving significant resources, said contracts will be governed by the 
national law of the country where the service is provided.207 Loan agreements with private 
entities entered into by the IBRD and the IMF are governed either by the law of the place 
of the loan or by the law on whose territory the private contracting banks are incorporated, 
or by the law of the State of New York.208 One should also exercise caution when ascribing 
to a particular transaction the characterization of contract, in the sense of an agreement 
encompassing both consideration and acceptance, as is the case with the IMF’s stand-by-
arrangements, which are not considered in any way as entailing a contractual 
relationship.209 Amerasinghe is of the view that agreements between international 
 204. Revised IBRD and IDA General Conditions (2017) (available at: 
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/577851500256855740/pdf/GCs-Board-paper-June-22-Final-with-
Annexes-06232017.pdf). 
 205. Office of Legal Affairs, Payment of Settlement Claims—Liabilities of a Private Law Nature—Procedures 
for Settlement—Budget Considerations, 2001 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 381, 384–85. 
 206. C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 171 (1962). 
 207. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 239. 
 208. IMF, Policy on Enlarged Access: Borrowing Agreement with the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, art. 
11(a), IMF Decision 6843 (81/75) (May 6, 1981) (cited in PHILLIPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT’S LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 462 (5th ed. 2001)). In such cases the World Bank Group may well trigger its 
privilege of immunity from suit by invoking it before the court. However, great reluctance is applied in invoking 
immunity. By way of example, an action against the IMF for failure to pay the amount due under any note or 
coupon may be brought before the federal courts of New York, England or Geneva. The IMF agreed in that case 
to waive its immunity from suit and execution. See also GOLD, supra note 124, at 69. 
 209. Under Art XXX(b) of the IMF Articles of Agreement, a stand-by-arrangement is defined as “a decision 
of the Fund by which a member is assured that it will be able to make purchases from the General Resources 
Account in accordance with the terms of the decision during a specified period and up to a specified amount.”
Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Art. XXX, § b, July 22, 1944, amended Jan. 26, 2016. It is clear that Art. 
XXX(b) only refers to the Fund’s decision and not the letter of intent that is required of the petitioning State in 
which it sets forth the objectives and policies that will make up the financial program for which assistance is 
sought. To clarify that stand-by-agreements are not in fact contracts, the IMF adopted two distinct decisions. 
Decision No. 2603-(68/132), Sept. 20, 1968, reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND (7th. issue, 1975); Decision No. 6056-(79/38), Mar. 2, 1979, reprinted in SELECTED 
DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (10th. issue, 1983). Paragraph 7 of the 1968 Decision 
stated that “in view of the character of stand-by-arrangements, language having a contractual flavour will be 
avoided in stand-by-documents.” See generally Joseph Gold, The Legal Character of the Fund’s Stand-by-
Arrangements and Why it Matters, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PAMPHLET SERIES NO. 35 (1980). In 
the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis the IMF adopted numerous decisions regarding stand-by-agreements 
with member States. 
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financial institutions, such as the IBRD, EBRD, ADB and others, with private parties that 
are predicated on another loan or guarantee agreement with the private parties’ respective 
States should be seen as governed by international law.210 He rests his hypothesis on the 
international law provisions in the loan agreements “or by implication resulting from 
association”.211 Although the relevant sections of the Bank’s Loan Regulations and 
General Conditions of Loans clearly exclude the applicability of municipal law, this is 
only true where the municipal law does not serve to negate the provisions in the loan 
agreement. Thus, the parties may validly agree that particular parts of the contract be 
subjected to a given domestic law, under condition that it does not in any way negate any 
of the rights or obligations stipulated in the loan agreement. 
As a result of the aforementioned analysis it is no accident that trust funds, whether 
they possess legal personality or not, usually interact with other international actors, both 
public and private, through memoranda of understanding (“MoU”).212 Elsewhere we 
examined the potential binding character of some MoU on account of the obligations they 
raised and the language used thereto.213 These cases, however, represent the exception and 
since the trustees or executing agents of trust funds usually conclude all the practical 
agreements necessary for their operations, trust funds employ MoU for purposes that are 
more political than legal.214 Thus, they are used to promote cooperation between 
themselves and the private sector, as well as between other international organisations and 
States. This is particularly useful in respect of trust funds whose constitutive instrument 
relies on the active participation of the private sector and the formation of public-private 
partnerships, such as the Global Fund. 
B. The Performance of Quasi-Judicial Functions by Trust Funds 
There is no legal impediment as to why trust funds cannot exercise a judicial 
function, partially or wholly, as long as this is clearly mandated in their respective 
constitutive instruments. So far, we have examined small trust funds established to serve 
international judicial institutions, but in this section we shall focus on the judicial nature 
of those trusts endowed with some legal personality and which are empowered to assess 
complaints and appeals lodged by contracting entities, or interested third parties, as well 
as provide judicial pronouncements on matters falling within their jurisdiction. The Global 
Fund, for example, operates an internal appeals mechanism (“IAM”) and has promulgated 
a set of Rules to govern these appeals proceedings.215 The mechanism is designed to hear 
appeals from persons representing rejected proposals with a view to reconsideration. 
 210. AMERASINGHE, supra note 96, at 388–89. The EBRD does not distinguish between States and non-State 
entities in its contractual arrangements with borrowers and as a result has no hesitation to institute a uniform and 
consistent application of public international law as the governing law of its contracts with all borrowers. John 
W. Head, Evolution of the Governing Law for Loan Agreements of the World Bank and Other Multilateral 
Development Banks, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 214, 230 (1996). 
 211. AMERASINGHE, supra note 96, at 388–89. 
 212. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between UNAIDS and the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and 
Malaria (Jan. 22, 2003), the purpose of which is to foster mutual collaboration. 
 213. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 20 (2000). 
 214. Charles Lipson, Why are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT. ORG 495, 501. 
 215. Rules Governing Internal Appeal Mechanism, GLOB. FUND,
https://www.who.int/hdp/publications/13i.pdf?ua=1 (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
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Although the members of the IAM come from the Global Fund’s participating 
organisations, they are to act independently.216 Similarly, the Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
Aceh and Nias (Indonesian Tsunami) has established a mechanism for receiving 
complaints relating to corruption, fraud and misuse of recovery and reconstruction funds 
and has adopted guidelines for the purposes of its internal investigations.217 These 
complaints may be received in confidence even from persons that have no contractual or 
other relationship with the trust fund. In the same manner, the CEO of the GEF set up an 
independent post of Conflict Resolution Commissioner, whose role is to work directly 
with member States and agencies to help resolve disputes and address complaints and other 
issues of importance to GEF operations.218 The locus standi, therefore, in respect of these 
internal procedures is not necessarily of a numerus clausus nature. 
On the other hand, the Compensation Fund for Iraq established by the UN Security 
Council does not exercise a judicial function.219 Its existence serves to give effect to the 
awards of the Compensation Commission, which itself possesses judicial attributes. The 
author is not aware of other trust funds that exercise a sole judicial function and in practice, 
even if the Security Council were to set up a judicial institution it would most probably 
opt for a dual model; i.e., a trust fund in the form of an account and a distinct judicial 
institution. We have, nonetheless, identified the existence of a true judicial body emanating 
from within a trust fund agreement with the aim of identifying beneficiaries from the 
fund’s assets. This concerns the Marshall Islands Claims Tribunal (otherwise Nuclear 
Claims Tribunal), founded under Article II(6)(c) of the US-Marshall Islands Agreement 
for the Implementation of Section 177 of their respective Compact of Free Association, 
which effectively set up the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Fund.220 That the tribunal is 
a true and independent judicial organ is expressly stated in Article IV(1)(b) of the 
Implementation Agreement, its governing law being that of the Marshall Islands, including 
local traditional (customary) law, as well as relevant international law and in the absence 
of either, US law.221 In reality, the Nuclear Claims Tribunal has no problem relying 
significantly on US statute and case law.222 Its decisions have concerned both class 
actions223 as well as individual injury compensation claims. 
 216. GLOB. FUND, Rules Governing Internal Appeals Mechanism,
https://www.who.int/hdp/publications/13i.pdf?ua=1 (last visited Jan. 31, 2021). 
 217. See generally Indonesia: News flash multi donor fund, RELIEFWEB (Apr. 6, 2006),
https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/indonesia-news-flash-multi-donor-fund. 
 218. Conflict Resolution Commissioner, GEF, https://www.thegef.org/conflict-resolution (last visited Jan. 23, 
2021). 
 219. S.C. Res. 692 (May 20, 1991). 
 220. Agreement for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association, U.S.-Marsh. Is., 
art. II, § 6(c), June 25, 1983, KAV 4575. This is also true in respect of the Ilois Trust Fund set up by agreement 
between the UK and Mauritius in order to compensate natives of the Chagos Archipelago that were forcibly 
moved to Mauritius by the UK government. Accordingly, the Board of the Fund was vested with authority to 
identify and compensate beneficiaries. 
 221. Agreement for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association, U.S.-Marsh. Is., 
art. IV, §§ 1(b), (3), June 25, 1983, KAV 4575. 
 222. For example, In Re Matter of the People of Enewetak et al., NCT Judgment No. 23-0902 (Aug. 3, 2003), 
where the NCT makes extensive use of US case law, inter alia.
 223. Id.; In Re Matter of the People of Bikini, et al., NCT Judgment No. 23-04134 (Mar. 5, 2001); In Re Matter 
of the People of Utrik, et al., NCT Judgment No. 23-06103 (Dec. 15, 2006); In Re Matter of Alabs of Rongelap, 
et al., NCT Judgment No. 2302440 (Apr. 17, 2007). 
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An exceptional example of a trust fund set up to administer a judicial function is that 
set up on the basis of the 1976 Agreement for the Establishment of a European Laying-Up 
Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels.224 The purpose of the Agreement was to prevent 
excess freight capacity accumulating in the inland waterways of the Rhine and Moselle 
basins by compensating carriers operating therein in return for the voluntary withdrawal 
of their vessels during certain periods.225 This was to be achieved through the 
establishment of a Fund and the creation of a Fund Tribunal, which was empowered to 
give preliminary rulings at the request of the national courts of the Fund’s EC member 
States and also of Switzerland (a party to the Fund Agreement) concerning the 
interpretation of the Agreement or the Fund’s Statute.226 The decisions of the Tribunal 
were to be deemed binding and directly applicable in all EC member States, in accordance 
with Article 39 of the Statute. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, earlier 
known as European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)) found that although the Community was 
empowered to enter into agreements of this nature with Switzerland because they fell 
within the ambit of its common transport policy,227 the EC member States to the 
Agreement had acted ultra vires in allotting such powers to themselves and to the Fund 
that were expressly reserved solely for the Community and its institutions. Equally, the 
exclusion of an EC member State, namely Ireland, rendered the Fund’s structure and 
decision-making procedure incompatible with EC law.228
C. Implied Powers of Trust Funds 
There are instances of trust funds being set up on the basis of the implied powers 
inherent in the organ within the organisation that established them.229 In this section we 
are interested in the implied powers of trust funds themselves. This concept is more 
commonly associated in the legal literature with the powers of international organisations, 
but we shall employ it in this context to interpret the residual competencies of trust funds. 
To begin, two considerations are significant: a) implied powers are those that are sought 
beyond the explicit wording of the constitutive instrument; b) said powers, if found to 




 226. Id. at 7. 
227. Opinion 1/76 on Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-Up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels
(Apr. 26, 1977), 99 ILR 269, 284–85. 
 228. Id. at 286–87. 
 229. See also N. D. White, Accountability and Democracy within the United Nations: A Legal Perspective, 13 
INT’L REL. 1, 15 (1999), who argues that the concept of implied powers covers all those powers necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the organisation; D. SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY 64 (1st ed. 1999). The Office of the UN Legal Counsel noted that Article 22 of the UN 
Charter certainly authorises the Assembly to establish subsidiary organs, presumably even in the aforementioned 
manner involving subsequent adoption by one principal organ to the detriment of another. Thus, the UN Legal 
Counsel concluded that “as a consequence of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3019, the Fund ceased 
to be a trust fund of the Secretary-General and becomes a Fund under the authority of the General Assembly with 
an intergovernmental governing body, having its own financial regulations and rules . . . [and as a result] became 
a subsidiary organ of the Assembly similar to other Funds having intergovernmental supervisory bodies, such as 
UNICEF, the Capital Development Fund and the United Nations Special Fund”. 1979 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 172 
(1979), Sales No. E. 82.V.1. 
38
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss2/5
2021] LEGAL PERSONALITY OF WORLD BANK FUNDS 247 
exist, can only provide legal effects vis-à-vis those entities that are themselves bound by 
the trust’s constitutive instrument. 
Trust funds established by the UN Security Council must undoubtedly be viewed as 
being endowed with significant authority, particularly where they are entrusted with 
powers as opposed to functions. Council resolution 692, following the conclusion of the 
Iraq-Kuwait conflict, set up a Compensation Commission (“UNCC”) and a Compensation 
Fund, which was to be replenished through the sale of Iraqi oil royalties.230 Both entities 
came under the direction of a Governing Council, which was granted significant latitude, 
deciding that “the requirement for Iraqi contributions will apply in the manner prescribed 
by the Governing Council with respect to all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products . . . 
[further requesting] that all States and international organisations cooperate with the 
decisions of the Governing Council . . . “231
From the wording of the resolution the Compensation Fund and the Commission are 
two distinct entities under a common leadership and although the aforementioned extract 
from the resolution refers to the mandate of the Commission, it also encompasses the Fund 
because the mandate is addressed to the Governing Council and not the Commission.232
The Governing Council subsequently adopted a decision by which it imposed particular 
obligations on Iraqi proceeds and sale of petroleum, as well as the means of payment into 
the Fund and an escrow account and obliged neighbouring States to provide customs 
documentations as to the volume and value of Iraqi shipments. Similar requirements were 
addressed to private entities.233 It also proceeded to ask the Security Council to immunise 
all Iraqi petroleum exports in transit from attachment and seizure, as well as immunize the 
Compensation Fund and the new escrow account.234 These actions are not described per 
se in Resolution 692 but are clearly essential in the fulfilment of the Governing Council’s
mandate, as well as others relating to the functions of the Fund.235
Other trust funds established by Security Council resolution have been granted only 
a very small amount of powers and the wording of their respective resolutions renders very 
difficult a broad interpretation, if at all any, of implied powers.236 Implied powers are also 
present in trust funds established by other UN principal organs, such as the Trust Fund for 
the financing of the UN Angola Verification Mission, adopted by resolution of the General 
Assembly.237 Therein, the trustee was authorised to take all necessary action to ensure the 
efficiency and economy of the mission. Given the binding nature of the Assembly’s
resolutions regarding budgetary matters within the UN system, the exercise of implied 
 230. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, UN 568, 671, https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-
92/Chapter%208/MIDDLE%20EAST/item%2022_Iraq-Kuwait_.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 231. Id. at 662. 
 232. Id. at 668. 
 233. United Nations Climate Change Decision regarding Arrangements for Ensuring Payments to the 
Compensation Fund, at 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/6 (Oct. 23, 1991). 
 234. Id. at 3–4.
 235. Particularly, United Nations Climate Change Decision on Guiding Principles regarding Priority of 
Payment and Payment Mechanism, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.17 (Mar. 24, 1994); United Nations Climate Change 
Decision on Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10 (June 26 1992). 
 236. See S.C. Res. 1177 establishing the UN Trust Fund for the Delimitation and Demarcation of the Border 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, at para. 8 (June 26, 1998). 
 237. G.A. Res. 43/231 (Feb. 16, 1989). 
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fiscal powers, as a result of the aforementioned mandate, is significant, even if limited in 
scope. Equally, international financial institutions administering trust funds or trust 
accounts may validly entrust to the internal managers of said trusts a range of implied 
powers. The IMF’s Instrument for a Framework Administered Account for Technical 
Assistance Activities states in section 8 that “[s]ubject to approval, the [trust account’s]
managing director is authorised (i) to make all arrangements, including establishment of 
accounts in the name of the Fund, as he deems necessary to carry out the operations of the 
Framework Account; and (ii) to take all other measures he deems necessary to implement 
the provisions of this Instrument.”238 Given that participating States must approve the 
arrangements stipulated in the Instrument before being bound to contribute or apply for 
grants, the account possesses significant powers. 
The instruments surveyed in this section may be interpreted as generating implied 
powers that produce legal effects vis-à-vis implicated States, IOs and private entities. 
Implied powers may, however, also encompass competences that do not produce legal 
effects, such as the freedom to solicit contributions from potential donors. 
i. Enforcement Powers and Collective Action against the Fund 
The following two sections will examine two distinct but inter-related mechanisms. 
The first concerns the ability of the trustee and of the trusts’ executive organs to enforce 
compliance vis-à-vis defaulting parties, whereas the second discusses the existence of 
possible group action against the trust or the trustee in respect of their broader obligations 
to the stakeholders of the financed project. With regard to the first issue under 
consideration, it will become clear that adherence to the practice of intergovernmental 
organisations’ enforcement powers against defaulting member States is highly problematic 
when applied to trust funds on the basis of the trusts’ strictly voluntary nature; nonetheless, 
some convergence is increasingly visible. With respect to the World Bank’s responsibility 
against its wider community of stakeholders we shall be focusing on the possibility of 
bringing a collective action against the World Bank as trustee before its Inspection Panel. 
The operation of trust funds has not so far implicated the jurisdiction of the Inspection 
Panel and it is hoped that this section will provide a theoretical insight as to its potential 
application. 
ii. Enforcement Powers of the Trustee and the Trust’s Executive Organ 
It is fair to say that agreements between equal partners in both domestic and 
international law do not as a rule provide for particular rules of enforcement because this 
would require the appointment of an authority with a view to assessing infractions (this is 
hardly cost-effective); it would also entail from the outset a sense of mistrust between the 
parties. Thus, in their vast majority, the preferred method for resolving non-compliance 
with the terms of an agreement in international law is through the stipulation of a dispute 
settlement mechanism.239 Given its standard insertion in all agreements it raises no friction 
 238. Decision No. 10942-(95/33) (Apr. 3, 1995, as amended in 2019) (available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/SelectedDecisions/Description.aspx?decision=10942-(95/33)). 
 239. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
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between the parties and does not require the appointment of an overseeing entity. 
Certainly, international society knows of multiple treaty arrangements whereby an 
enforcement mechanism is established for non-compliant and recalcitrant States; a good 
example is the enforcement authority of the UN Security Council through the mandatory 
nature of its resolutions and its capacity to secure compliance.240 While the Security 
Council may, in contrast to the usual enforcement powers of international organisations, 
adopt forceful measures against a State that has committed an act of aggression, the typical 
function of enforcement powers pertinent to international organisations includes expulsion 
of their members for failure to pay their arrears and other contractual obligations, although 
this is rare and is employed sparingly.241 Moreover, States may be expelled, or stringent 
conditions imposed on them, where they are deemed to have persistently committed gross 
violations of human rights.242 Equally, a member State may find itself precluded from 
exercising particular rights that would otherwise pertain by reason of membership.243
With respect to international trust funds, the status of participants as donors 
necessarily limits the need for an enforcement mechanism. The existence of such a 
mechanism may be viewed by prospective donors as not only a contractualisation of 
pledges (which they may find undesirable), which are not binding in nature,244 but also as 
a compulsion to what is otherwise an act of purely voluntary expression. Even if the parties 
agreed to the incorporation of enforcement powers against a donor for failure to make his 
contribution—following a binding agreement with the trustee—these would serve no 
meaningful purpose since the worst possible outcome for the donor would be his exclusion 
from further contributions! The futility of enforcement action is further reinforced by the 
fact that donors to a trust are only liable up to the amount of their contribution.245 Thus, 
in order for the exercise of enforcement powers to have any real effect, they must regulate 
asymmetrical legal relationships, or relationships between equal partners but in situations 
where the expulsion or exclusion of a partner is not without financial or other 
 240. See generally id.
 241. See generally KONSTANTINOS MAGLIVERAS, EXCLUSION FROM PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS: THE LAW AND PRACTICE BEHIND MEMBER STATES’ EXPULSION AND SUSPENSION OF 
MEMBERSHIP (Springer 1999). 
 242. In 1999, for example, Burma (Myanmar) was expelled from the International Labour Organization for its 
sustained and pervasive use of forced labour. See International Labour Organization Governing Body Resolution 
on Measures, including action under Article 33 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization, to 
secure compliance by the Government of Myanmar with the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry 
established to examine the observance of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), International Labour 
Office Doc. GB 276/6 (Nov. 1999). 
 243. Thus, the Third Amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement provided for the suspension of voting and 
other related rights of members that did not live up to their obligations under the Agreement. 
 244. See Rep. of the S.C., at 4–5, U.N. Doc. A/57332 (2002); UN Secretary-General, Establishment and 
Management of Trust Funds, at ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/188 (Mar. 1, 1982); The Instrument for the Restructured 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) of March 2008, Annex C, 2(b), states that in cases of qualified instruments 
of commitment, the donor State “undertakes to exercise its best efforts to obtain legislative approval for the full 
amount of its contribution by the [agreed] payments date”; J. E. Archibald, Pledges of Voluntary Contributions 
to the United Nations by Member States: Establishing and Enforcing Legal Obligations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L.R. 317, 317–18, 329 (2004). Archibald rightly comments that with regard to unpaid voluntary contributions, 
the UN does not invoke Art. 19 of the UN Charter. Id. at 325–26. 
 245. See generally Rebecca Lee, The Evolution of the Modern International Trust: Developments and 
Challenges, 103 IOWA L. REV. 2069 (2018). 
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consequences.246 Hence, expulsion of members to a trust fund is possible even if it is not 
expressly stipulated by the terms of the trust agreement on the basis of general principles 
of international institutional law, although it is rare in practice and should not materialise 
as a means of last resort.247 For an act of expulsion or restriction of the rights of the party 
to take effect, a fundamental and persistent violation of the terms of the agreement must 
have taken place and all calls for obeisance must have been ignored. The ensuing executive 
decision must be adopted by the fund’s executive organ either by consensus or by a 
majority representing at least two-thirds of the parties thereto. 
Very few trust instruments provide their executive bodies with enforcement powers 
against trust members. Exceptionally, Article 9(2)(a) of the Prototype Carbon Fund 
authorises the trustee to remove ineligible participants from the Fund, following approval 
of a two-thirds majority of the votes of the Fund.248 In the absence of an enforcement 
mechanism in the trust agreement or its terms of reference, it is queried whether the 
adoption of enforcement measures may be justified by reference to the constitutional, or 
other, instruments of the trustee. In the case of the World Bank acting as trustee, save for 
the termination of the trust fund through a unilateral act (and only where stipulated in the 
trust agreement), the Bank cannot rely on its Articles of Agreement, and particularly 
Article VI(2), in order to suspend a donor to the trust fund.249 This is clearly so because 
the Bank’s Articles of Agreement refer to obligations and rights accruing between the 
parties thereto and are not susceptible to extra-contractual legal effects.250 This is different 
from the requirement that the operations of trust funds must comply with the relevant 
operational policies of the Bank and its Articles of Agreement, which refers solely to 
compliance with respect to substantive rules.251 The enforcement powers of the Bank are 
related to procedural norms, which the parties to a trust fund will certainly not accept. This 
author is of the view that the IMF’s surveillance powers under Article IV(3)(b) of its 
Articles of Agreement are applicable to those trust funds created on the basis of the Fund’s
executive board decisions.252 This conclusion is justified where the IMF’s trust facilities 
pertain to the obligations of the borrowing States under Article IV(1) of its Articles of 
Agreement by which they adhere to sustain and implement conditions necessary for 
financial and economic stability and to assure orderly exchange arrangements and promote 
a stable system of exchange rates. Given that the principal objective of these trust funds is 
to tackle economic stability and growth through the elimination of poverty, 
 246. Id.
 247. It certainly is a plausible measure of last resort in the context of trust funds organised as intergovernmental 
organisations, as is the case with Art. 31 of the Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, 
which stipulates the possibility of membership suspension. 
 248. Sophie Smyth, The Prototype Carbon Fund: A New Departure in International Trusts and Securities 
Law, 5 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POLY 28, 29 (2005). 
 249. Article VI: Withdrawal and Suspension of Membership: Suspension of Operations, WORLD BANK 1, 15
(June 27, 2012), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/722361541184234501/IBRDArticlesOfAgreement-
English.pdf. 
 250. See generally International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Articles of Agreement, WORLD 
BANK (June 27, 2012), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/722361541184234501/IBRDArticlesOfAgreement-
English.pdf. 
 251. See generally Articles of Agreement of the IBRD, art. 4, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, 146. 
 252. See generally Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. 4, § 3(b), 2 U.N.T.S. 39. 
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underdevelopment, export, and exchange rate imbalances, etc., the IMF’s surveillance 
powers extend to the operations of borrowers of trust funds. Article IV(3)(b) underpins the 
Fund’s authority as follows: “[T]he Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the 
exchange rate policies of members, and shall adopt specific principles for the guidance of 
all members with respect to those policies.”253
In recent decades the IMF has in practice extended the scope of its narrowly worded 
surveillance authority over members’ exchange rate policies to cover also financial 
stability and financial sector policies.254 We have already determined that the trust funds 
established and managed by the IMF do not have a contractual nature255 and as a result 
the IMF’s surveillance powers are applicable over States that make use of them. If their 
nature was contractual, the IMF would not possess surveillance powers. 
Certainly, however, the loss of voting rights must be viewed as inherent in a party’s
failure to pay its arrears or financial contribution, but this result must be confirmed by the 
body exercising the trust’s decision-making authority. Obviously, the trustee is at liberty 
to employ his inherent trust powers, which must necessarily exist, in order to force the 
beneficiaries to comply with their obligations once they have signed their grant agreement 
with the trust. Some of these powers are implicit by their very contractual stipulation, such 
as disqualification from future grant arrangements, discontinuation of the grant itself, 
particularly where this is paid in tranches and others. Moreover, the mandate of the trust 
also entails extra-contractual powers on the part of the trustee. The legal basis of these 
implied powers is justly derived from the trust structure itself and the fiduciary role of the 
trustee therein. To the extent that these powers are absolutely necessary in order for the 
trustee to accomplish his mandate and which do not, at the same time, conflict with the 
trust agreement, their characterisation as implied powers is well justified. Were the UN 
Security Council to set up a trust fund as a subsidiary organ thereto, that fund would be 
able to exercise its conferred powers in the same way as the Council and demand from UN 
member States full obeisance—assuming the Council conferred powers and not merely 
functions. In this case, the enforcement powers of the Council would be conferred on the 
body of the trust, albeit exercisable by the trustee and the governing body of the trust. 
iii. Collective Action against the World Bank as Trustee before the Bank’s
Inspection Panel 
Where any of the entities making up the World Bank Group act as trustees (but more 
essentially the IBRD and IDA),256 or otherwise partake in the implementation of the 
 253. Id.
254. The principles of surveillance were elaborated by IMF. See Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies, 
Decision No. 5392-(77/63) (Apr. 29, 1977); see also LASTRA, supra note 130, at 399. 
 255. As far as the relationship between the IMF as trustee and the borrowers is concerned, this is not wholly 
clear from the terms of the relevant instruments. Certainly the IMF does not expressly subject these to the regime 
of stand-by-arrangements under Article XXX(b) of its Articles of Agreement, nor is it possible to assimilate them 
to extended arrangements because the financial resources loaned to the borrower are not derived from the IMF’s
General Resources Account, as is otherwise required in respect of extended arrangements. In order to decipher 
the precise legal nature of this relationship one has to assess the practice of the Fund. 
 256. The resolution setting up the Inspection Panel does not encompass other World Bank entities. In a request 
against the IFC in 1996, in which the affected group asked the Panel to investigate alleged irregularities, the case 
was not eventually investigated by the Panel through lack of jurisdiction. Ultimately, through an ad hoc 
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operations of a trust fund established under international law, the jurisdiction of the 
Inspection Panel of the World Bank comes into play. This jurisdiction is not obvious in 
the wording of the relevant resolution as it omits any reference to trusts.257 Paragraph 12 
of the Resolution setting up the Inspection Panel states that: 
The Panel shall receive requests for inspection presented to it by an affected party in the 
territory of the borrower which is not a single individual (i.e. a community of persons such 
as an organisation, association, society or other grouping of individuals) or by the local 
representative of such party or by another representative . . . The affected party must 
demonstrate that its rights or interests have been or are likely to be directly affected by an 
action or omission of the Bank as a result of a failure of the Bank to follow its operational 
policies and procedures with respect to the design, appraisal, and/or implementation of a 
project financed by the Bank (including situations where the Bank is alleged to have failed 
in its follow-up on the borrower’s obligations under loan agreements with respect to such 
policies and procedures) provided in all cases that such failure has had, or threatens to have, 
a material adverse effect. In view of the institutional responsibilities of the Executive 
Directors in the observance by the Bank of its operational policies and procedures, an 
Executive Director may in special cases of serious alleged violations of such policies and 
procedures ask the Panel for an investigation . . . .258
The jurisdiction of the Panel may be triggered by an application of an affected 
community, which neatly corresponds to the types of beneficiaries envisaged in trust funds 
( i.e., through class or category). These communities need not necessarily be direct 
beneficiaries of the fund, but may constitute groups simply affected by the operations of 
the trust. The main obstacle in triggering the jurisdiction of the Inspection Panel is 
demonstrating in every case that the trust fund under consideration is financed by the 
Bank.259 The relevant paragraph does not require that the Bank finance the entirety of a 
project for it to fall within the Panel’s jurisdiction; thus, partial financing, or co-financing, 
will suffice.260 As shown by  this article the Bank typically contributes also to the 
financing of the vast majority of trust fund projects in which it acts as trustee, as was the 
case for example with the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project and the funds established for 
the purposes of that operation.261 The same is also true with respect to the International 
Reconstruction Fund for Iraq (IRFI). As a result, it is fair to assume that with respect to 
the operations of trusts in which the Bank is a trustee with even a partial financial 
arrangement, the Bank’s senior management established the office of Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) 
with jurisdiction over IFC and MIGA-financed projects. See J. D. Hair, et al., Pangue ‘Hydroelectric Project: 
An Independent Review of the International Finance Corporation’s Compliance with Applicable World Bank 
Group Environmental and Social Requirements (World Bank Group Apr. 4, 1997). 
 257. Int’l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev. Res. 93-10; Int’l Dev. Ass’n Res. 93-6, The World Bank Inspection 
Panel (Sept. 22, 1993). 
 258. In a 1996 Review of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel and Clarification of Certain Aspects 
of the Resolution (Oct. 17, 1996), the word “project” in the 1993 Resolution was found to possess “the same 
meaning as it generally has in the Bank’s practice, and includes projects under consideration by Bank 
management, as well as projects already approved by the Executive Directors”.
 259. See INSPECTION PANEL, ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE WORLD BANK: THE INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON,
at 18 (2003). 
 260. INSPECTION PANEL, THE INSPECTION PANEL: ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE WORLD BANK 107 (2018). 
 261. See generally WORLD BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline 
Project, Report No: 36569-TD (Dec. 2006). 
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contribution the requirement that the project be financed by the Bank is satisfied and thus 
the Panel may exercise its authority. What remains uncertain is whether the mere 
undertaking of the function of trustee without any form of additional financing qualifies 
the affected communities and additionally gives them locus standi to lodge a complaint 
with the Panel. On the basis of the Panel’s jurisprudence it is competent to entertain claims 
pertinent to both project lending and development policy lending,262 but these are hardly 
akin to a mere trustee function that is of a purely administrative nature. 
From a literal reading of paragraph 12 it is clearly evident that the sentence contained 
in brackets is not meant to add further situations to the Bank’s own failure to comply with 
its policies; rather, it refers to such failures when committed by the Bank’s borrowers, but 
only in respect of loan agreements. Disbursement (otherwise known as “grant”)
agreements would thus not qualify, as they are not loan agreements.263 However, trust 
funds that envisage the possibility of loan agreements in which the Bank makes no 
financial contribution would certainly fall within the Panel’s jurisdiction. A literal 
interpretation of paragraph 12 does not support the argument that mere trusteeship can 
trigger the jurisdiction of the Panel.264 Nonetheless, it would be grossly unjust for the 
Panel to deny the eligibility of such requests, given that the engagement of the trustee in 
respect of trust funds in which the trustee possesses significant decision-making authority 
is more significant politically than the trust funds’ financial component.265 At this point 
in time the ethical justification of this argument (including its basis in notions of justice) 
is stronger than its normative counterpart. 
As regards the failure of the Bank and the borrower to adhere to the Bank’s
operational policies, it has already been established that in practice the Bank’s model 
trustee agreements with donors stipulate conformity with these policies and are thus an 
integral part of all trust and donor agreements. Were the claimants, however, to argue that 
the Bank, as trustee, failed to comply with the trust’s terms of reference, or its contractual 
undertakings with the donors and the beneficiaries (through the grant agreements), albeit 
while in full compliance with its institutional policies, then the jurisdiction of the Panel 
could not be triggered because these agreements are outside the scope of paragraph 12.266
In such cases the affected communities can only seek civil remedies on the basis of their 
grant agreements with the Bank and certainly not as third parties to the agreements 
between the donors and the trustee. Obviously, the best possible outcome that an affected 
community may realistically expect from a claim before the Inspection Panel is an 
Executive Board decision by which the project is either discontinued or which forces the 
 262. In respect of development policy lending (formerly known as structural adjustment operations), see the 
Bangladesh Jute Sector Adjustment Credit case, Panel Report and Recommendation, at para. 9 (Mar. 14, 1997); 
and the Papua New Guinea Governance Promotion Adjustment Loan case, Inspection Panel and 
Recommendation (Jan. 1, 2002). 
 263. IBRD Res. 93-10; Int’l Dev. Ass’n Res. 93-6, The World Bank Inspection Panel (Sept. 22, 1993). 
 264. See IBRD Res. 93-10; Int’l Dev. Ass’n Res. 93-6, The World Bank Inspection Panel (Sept. 22, 1993). 
 265. This point has not received any attention in the relevant literature but is supported by at least one other 
commentator. See S. Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank Inspection Panel: A Record of the First International 
Accountability Mechanism and Its Role for Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (1999) (noting that “Bank 
actions as trustee of the Global Environmental Facility and other trust funds are implicitly subject to the Panel’s
jurisdiction.”).
 266. See IBRD Res. 93-10; Int’l Dev. Ass’n Res. 93-6, The World Bank Inspection Panel (Sept. 22, 1993). 
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borrower to complete the project, albeit under strict adherence to the Bank’s policies and 
procedures. 
VII. CONCLUSION
It is evident that trust funds are mushrooming in the everyday practice of the World 
Bank. Not only is it achieving one of its primary purposes by taking on the role of trustee, 
but at the same time it is making considerable profit from such a function. The Bank, 
overall, shows little interest in the legal personality of the trusts it is administering; rather, 
its key interest lies in its contractual relationship with the creators and donors of trusts, as 
well as its liabilities and duties therefrom. The legal form and personality of each fund has 
taken shape as a result of ad hoc or long-term considerations, particularly on the basis of 
the capital growth of each fund. Such legal personality varies from mere bank accounts in 
private banks to fully-fledged inter-governmental organisations. Just like UN trust funds, 
their World Bank counterparts have generally developed on the basis of the internal 
constitution of the trustee, but the size of each fund dictates their corporate governance 
structure.267 Although corporate governance is beyond the scope of this article, it suffices 
to say that the more elaborate such governance is, more complexity and transaction costs 
belie its operations. Given that trust funds are set up to disburse funds to their intended 
beneficiaries, it is not in their interest to increase their overall transaction costs. 
This article has shown that there is no single legal personality that fits all trust funds, 
whether administered by the World Bank or other inter-governmental trustees. Even so, 
current practice clearly suggests that trustees and donors have become entrepreneurial 
when deciding the form and nature of a trust. Private international law, taxes and liabilities, 
are as important if not more than international law considerations. The growth of 
transnational law may, in time, help to place trust funds in that sphere of regulation, which 
in turn would render trusts both public and private actors, subject to industry rules and 
processes.268
 267. Bantekas, supra note 2, at 224. 
 268. See Ilias Bantekas, The Contractualization of Public International Law, INT’L J.L.C. (forthcoming 2021). 
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